


KILL 'EM ALL CONSERVATIVES ■ HALT, CHRISTIAN SOLDIERS

NOVEMBER 6, 2006

The American Conservative

GOP and Man at Yale

Campus
Conservatism
Flunks Out



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REAL CONSERVATISM

It's so refreshing to read what real conservatives have to say rather than the neocon, globalist party line that comes out of the White House and its mouthpieces in the media. The biggest hijacking of this century has not been by Muslim terrorists but by old-style leftists who have taken over the Republican Party. Their use of that old favorite leftist epithet "fascist" gives them away.

Thanks also for your stand against this insane Bush war in Iraq, as well as illegal immigration. I worked in manufacturing in Texas and California for 22 years, so I had plenty of exposure to the problem. These people laugh at our system.

I wish I could support *The American Conservative* with more than just my subscription, but I'm one of those 3 million people who have lost their manufacturing jobs recently. I now drive a school bus and do part-time work to make 80 percent less than I used to. Five of the last six plants I worked at over 25 years are closed down. I'm one of those guys the rosy "macro" economic numbers don't apply to.

I hope *The American Conservative* stays in publication for a long time to come.

ROBERT ORRIS
Parma, Ohio

BON APPÉTIT!

As a third-generation New Deal liberal, it is not often that my mind is exposed to a magazine like yours. But I am deeply stunned by your last two issues. Such clear, intelligent, sincere political discourse as I have feasted upon in these issues was more than I ever hoped to see on this earth. Thank you for what you do.

Although not always agreeing 100 percent with everything said or suggested, I am astonished at how much concurrence there can be between me and so much of what you say.

What a wonderful nation we might become—yes, even more so—if we could learn to better understand one

another, dialogue more sincerely and respectfully, and find common ground to do good things together. Congratulations on your wonderful magazine.

FRANKLIN KNOWLTON
Denver, Colo.

KUDOS TO SCHROEDER

"Liberating Ourselves" (Oct. 9) has explained to me why the Iraq War has given me a headache for years. I have tried to be loyal to my country while believing *TAC's* arguments about the war. Still I hoped we might pull it off, if only Europe would help us.

My gratitude to history professor Paul Schroeder knows no bounds. I will read his article again and again. It's on my night table! Will *The American Conservative* please feature Dr. Schroeder's truly educated thoughts on all our country's dilemmas as often as possible—including on Israel, on which he wishes to hold back at this time? We citizens can take it, professor! In fact, we need your knowledge.

I was born in New England in 1931 and have always voted. Not this November. There is no politician out there with Dr. Schroeder's knowledge, and I doubt I'll live long enough to see one learn.

LINDA CROWLEY
Cochranville, Pa.

CAFETERIA CLOSED

The American Conservative's editors carefully balance the historically volatile Catholic-Protestant subject, *viz.*, Thomas E. Woods Jr.'s philo-Catholic article "Recovering the Lost Liturgy" (Oct. 9) versus counter-Catholic perspectives such as John O'Sullivan's affirmation of Samuel Huntington's insistence that American Catholics become "political Protestants." *TAC's* ecumenism sees Woods pointing to the English intellectuals, "Catholic and non-Catholic alike," petitioning Pope Paul VI for the traditional Latin Mass—"one of the great treasures of Western civilization" that "belongs to universal culture," Woods insists, just as O'Sullivan, himself

a Catholic, firmly asserted that he took no offense at Huntington's thesis.

Woods insists the modern mass was a near total capitulation to the Enlightenment, but what Woods's otherwise thorough diagnosis critically misses is the Protestant dimension. Had he compared, he could not have implied the basic form of previous Catholic worship had not changed very much over the millennia. The Counter-Reformation forced major changes on the Catholic mass, notably congregational hymn singing pioneered by Martin Luther.

The new Mass has proved alienating for diverse reasons but chiefly because it contains a violent contradiction—the new Mass's obvious concession to Enlightenment rationalism, juxtaposed irreconcilably and contradictorily with the transubstantiated Eucharist's "mystery and wonderment" on which Catholicism is predicated. By contrast, the Protestant liturgy Luther pioneered, with the sermon as the service's liturgically pre-eminent climax, and communion de-emphasized, taking place in many Protestant churches once a month, before or after the service, or even nowadays not at all, with a merely memorialized or consubstantiated Eucharist, holistically reconciled the more rationalistic Catholic Liturgy of the Word with the Enlightenment.

So long as Catholicism continues confounding its flock by trying to force-fit the round peg of the new Mass into the square hole of Catholic tradition, it should not be surprised at the volume of lapsed, inactive, and alienated "cafeteria" Catholics.

DINO DRUDI
Washington, D.C.

The American Conservative welcomes letters to the editor. Submit by e-mail to letters@amconmag.com, by fax to 703-875-3350, or by mail to 1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA 22209. Please include your name, address, and phone number. We reserve the right to edit all correspondence for space and clarity.

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[DIPLOMACY]

NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH

Commenting on North Korea's nuclear test, former Sen. Sam Nunn told the *New York Times*, "[I]t tells you that we started at the wrong end of the 'axis of evil.'" By launching a military attack on Iraq, which posed no threat, President Bush not only accelerated the nuclear programs of other "pre-nuclear" states that felt threatened by American power but degraded Washington's diplomatic credibility.

For better or worse, the U.S. doesn't have a plausible military option to eliminate the North Korean regime and weapons program—at least none that could be used without unacceptable losses in Seoul. A stepping up of sanctions against North Korea (which has more or less held its own population under sanctions for a generation) could well lead to the regime's collapse—a good outcome, even if it temporarily produced millions of refugees. But meaningful sanctions will require full support from China, South Korea, and Japan, who are in the end far more threatened by North Korean nukes than we are.

If those front-line states wish to sanction the regime to the point of collapse, we should support them. But the last few years of Bushian "diplomacy" have left the world with a strong desire for more American modesty about our ability to solve global problems. The world, in this case, is correct. Washington should make clear its readiness to support whatever policy China, Japan, and South Korea come up with regarding the belligerent dictatorship in the North—including, if need be, living with it. That's not a perfect answer, but there is none better.

[ELECTION]

GOP GONE WILD

Some of the sordid details in the Foley scandal are still coming out as we go to press, but the political impact seems



certain. Evidence is gathering that the House Republican leadership was at least partially aware of Foley's dirty e-mails propositioning young male pages and chose to do nothing. Speaker Dennis Hastert and Congressman Tom Reynolds, chairman of the National Republican Congressional Committee, are among those tainted.

While this is not the worst example of the Republican Congress's malfeasance, it may be the final nail in the current majority's coffin. As Joshua Micah Marshall observed at Talking Points Memo, this at the very least cripples the congressional GOP leadership at a crucial juncture in the 2006 campaign. They cannot appear on the Sunday morning talk shows or barnstorm for congressional candidates in swing districts without facing unwanted questions, reminding voters of the Foley incident at every turn. Even if nothing more is revealed—which seems unlikely—this could be enough to turn a close election. The misconduct has already put Foley and Reynolds's seats in play.

Of course, this majority's unwillingness to hold itself accountable has been apparent for years, most tragically when it comes to our failed policies in Iraq. The fact that it took Foleygate to alert much of the media to these failures may be the greater scandal.

[IRAQ]

WAR PARTY PLANNING

Think what a big "Mission Accomplished" banner \$20 million will buy. The recently approved defense appropriations bill included that hefty sum for "commemoration of success" in Iraq and Afghanistan. The "day of celebration" outlay was part of last year's spending package as well but went unspent—for obvious reasons.

It's not surprising that a president who got us into war without a clear rationale might have trouble crafting a coherent exit strategy. But it would be comforting if Congress were doing more than party planning. Nearly four years later, 140,000 Americans remain in Iraq—caught in the middle of a civil war—without drawdown, much less victory, in sight. Yet the state of denial persists: the *New York Times* datelines from Baghdad, "Wearing a helmet and a flak jacket and flanked by machine-gun-toting bodyguards to defend against insurgents, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice came here Thursday, insisting that there were new signs of progress in Iraq..."

[IMMIGRATION]

FENCE FIBBING

The strongest—and perhaps only—remaining argument for voting Republican this year has been immigration. The

House GOP stood firm against the Senate and President Bush in favor of enforcement and against amnesty. It is unlikely that Speaker Pelosi would give immigration reformers the time of day. But for some Republicans, border security is just a sham.

Sen. John Cornyn didn't even wait until the election was over to announce the ruse. He predicted that the 700-mile security fence, a cornerstone of the House immigration bill, won't actually be built. "It is one thing to authorize," Cornyn told reporters. "It is another thing to appropriate money and do it." The Texas Republican is on record advocating a "virtual wall" instead—leaving the borders "virtually" open.

Cornyn's remarks came as President Bush signed with great fanfare an appropriation to build 150 miles of fencing (not 700) while the more comprehensive Secure Fence Act languished. Perhaps the administration hopes pro-enforcement voters won't notice the difference.

[LIBERTIES]

PAPERS, PLEASE

Over at Cuning Realist, one of our favorite bloggers relates:

This week I wanted to rent a mailbox at a U.S. post office. I arrived with my driver's license, birth certificate, and social security card, thinking these would more than suffice. After waiting in line for twenty minutes, I presented my documents to the clerk. He looked at them for a few seconds and said that two documents were required to rent a box, but only my driver's license was acceptable. When I asked for an explanation, he pointed to a sign that listed the acceptable documents. Indeed, a birth certificate and a social security card were not on

the list. What was? An 'alien registration card' and a 'certificate of naturalization.'

I don't know what genius in the federal bureaucracy decided that a driver's license, birth certificate, and a social security card *together* aren't enough to rent a post office box. But when a green card trumps a U.S. birth certificate in the eyes of the federal government, something has gone terribly wrong.

Postscript: What document did the post office ultimately accept after rejecting my birth certificate and social security card? A copy of my current apartment lease."

[IRAN]

19 GOOD MEN

Notice should be given the 19 House members who signed a letter to President Bush last month saying the United States has no reason to be afraid of talking to Iran and should begin to do so. Eleven Republicans, eight Democrats—organized by Wayne Gilchrest (R-Md). It is a tiny sliver of the House but perhaps the seed corn of a courageous bipartisan caucus willing to challenge the bellicosity that governs the White House's Mideast policies. The heavy GOP share of signers is welcome.

But much as the letter is praiseworthy, we are surprised by the small number of signatories. Four years after the shameful vote allowing Bush to go to war in Iraq, one would hope that more than a few congressmen would be ready to challenge the president's way of dealing with the world. His policies have resulted in the deaths of thousands of Americans, and—it is now estimated—more than 600,000 Iraqis. Now the same people who planned the war against Iraq want the United States to assault Iran. Haven't we learned a lesson yet? ■

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More Troops—or Less Empire

“[W]e are stretched too thin and need a larger military,” argued *The Weekly Standard* in a recent editorial entitled “More Troops.”

“Researchers at conservative think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation call for larger ground forces, as do thinkers at centrist and liberal organizations like Brookings, CSIS, and even the Center for American Progress.”

And why do we need more troops?

Because the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are going badly for lack of U.S. troops, and because, says the *Standard*, President Bush needs to have the strategic option to put ground forces into “Iran, North Korea, Somalia, Lebanon, or wherever the next crisis erupts.” The *Standard* wants the U.S. Army increased by 250,000.

Post-election, this issue will be debated in Congress and should provide the occasion for a larger debate on the issue: do we truly need more troops, or do we rather need fewer U.S. commitments to fight in places where no vital interests are imperiled? Is it not time, 15 years after the Cold War’s end, to begin dissolving old alliances and shedding commitments dating to a time when a Soviet Empire bestrode Europe and Asia like a colossus?

Case in point: South Korea. Why are 30,000 U.S. troops tied down on that peninsula half a century after the Chinese left North Korea and 15 years after the Soviet Union expired? If the 60 million Koreans, North and South, were raptured up to heaven, how would America be imperiled?

In the Korean War of 1950-53, the United States sent an army of a third of

a million men. One thousand U.S. soldiers died every month in Korea, compared to the 1,000 who die each year in Afghanistan and Iraq. Americans are not going to send another army to fight for South Korea. Nor should we.

The Cold War is over and South Korea, with an economy 40 times the size of the North’s, with twice the population and the latest in U.S. weapons, should undertake its own ground defense.

Before plunging into Vietnam, LBJ said, “American boys ought not to be doing the fighting that Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves.” That was a valid argument then. Why not now?

If the United States gave Seoul notice that all U.S. troops would be off the peninsula in a year and we were exercising our right to withdraw from the 1950s mutual security treaty, those U.S. troops could be returned home, and we would find Seoul suddenly far more receptive to Bush’s diplomacy than it has heretofore been.

Case in point: NATO, Ukraine, and Georgia. Until the Orange Revolution went sour, these two ex-republics of the USSR were advancing toward membership in NATO. Once in, any conflict between either nation and Russia would bring us in militarily. For the NATO charter reads that an attack against one is an attack against all. Is there a more insane idea floating about right now?

Kiev and Moscow have clashed over the pro-Western orientation of the new government and the Crimean peninsula that is home to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Khrushchev ceded the peninsula

to Ukraine. But eastern Ukraine is Russified in language, culture, and ethnicity, and different from the Orthodox center and Catholic west.

How is the United States strengthened by a commitment to go to war with the world’s second nuclear power, should a Russian-Ukrainian collision deteriorate into a shooting war?

Alliances are the transmission belts of war. While alliances can strengthen nations, they carry the risk of dragging their members into unnecessary wars. How would an alliance with Georgia, now in a nasty brawl with Moscow over Russian spies and the breakaway Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, strengthen America? Fifty years ago, Ike refused to risk war with Russia to save the Hungarian Revolution. Now we are going to fight Russia over Georgia?

When the debate over expanding the U.S. Army begins in 2007, there need to be voices raised calling for withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea and Central Asia, where they do not belong, and a bottom-up review of all U.S. war guarantees.

This will be denounced as isolationism. But was it isolationism for the Russians to go home from Cuba? Just as we wanted the French, British, Spanish, and, finally, Russians out of our hemisphere, other nations bristle at U.S. troops stationed just over their border.

We have more than enough soldiers to defend the United States and our vital interests and allies. If we will pull up the old trip wires we put down in the Cold War and bring home the troops manning those trip wires, we will also find that, suddenly, we have fewer quarrels and fewer enemies than the administration has managed to make for us. ■

[party on, dude]

GOP and Man at Yale

The intellectual dexterity that once distinguished campus conservatives has given way to mindless Republican boosterism.

By Daniel McCarthy

JAMES R. LAWRENCE III doesn't look like a campus misfit. The North Carolina State University senior has the kind of clean-cut, buttoned-down appearance one expects of a major in biomedical engineering, a field whose academic rigors leave little room for an "Animal House" or Abbie Hoffman way of life. But Lawrence is more unusual than his demeanor might suggest. He's distinctly in the minority of a minority, as both a campus conservative and one who's against the Iraq War.

In the eyes of some of his friends on the Right, that makes Lawrence really a kind of leftist. When he published an editorial for the anniversary of Hiroshima criticizing Harry Truman's use of nuclear weapons against Japan, one of his colleagues on the campus conservative paper, *The Broadside*, suggested he was its "token liberal." That isn't surprising—student conservatives across the country tend to resent any suggestion that U.S. foreign policy could be immoral. But it is ironic, considering that one of the classic texts of postwar conservatism, Richard M. Weaver's *Ideas Have Consequences*, was written in response to the horrors of the Second World War, including America's use of nuclear weapons. "The atomic bomb was a final blow to the code of humanity," Weaver wrote to a friend in 1945.

Lawrence cited Weaver and *Human Events* founding editor Felix Morley in his article, but that counted for little. The young men and women of the Right aren't reading much Richard Weaver these days—nor much Robert Nisbet or Russell Kirk, to name two other seminal conservative thinkers critical of modern warfare. The time when Young Americans for Freedom wore badges blazoned with the slogan "Don't Immanentize the Eschaton" has long passed. Now College Republicans parade in shirts proclaiming "George W. Bush Is My Homeboy." The campus Right has almost always been more activist than intellectual, just as the wider movement has been more political than cultural. But where once students were at least familiar with the names Kirk and Weaver, or Mises and Nock, today they look to Sean Hannity and Ann Coulter for guidance. They're little acquainted with the wisdom of the contemporary Right's founding generation, and it shows.

Campus conservatives are not just the future of the movement, they are its present as well. Alumni of the major right-wing youth organizations fill the ranks, and hold the commanding heights, of the institutions that mold conservative orthodoxy today. American Conservative Union Chairman David Keene is a former national direc-

tor of Young Americans for Freedom. Ann Coulter and *National Review* editor Rich Lowry are veterans of student papers affiliated with the Collegiate Network, the breeder reactor of conservative campus journalism. Karl Rove and Jack Abramoff launched their political careers as leaders of the College Republicans National Committee, as did Grover Norquist and Ralph Reed.

Reed might not like the look of today's conservative students. Journalists left and right have remarked upon how little they resemble the young Republicans of old; "there are plenty of ragged T-shirts, backward baseball caps and frayed jeans" among them, according to the *New York Times Magazine*, as well as the occasional instance of "full goth regalia." The *Times* labels them "Hipublicans." *City Journal's* Brian Anderson calls them "South Park Conservatives" and notes they differ from Ralph Reed on more than just sartorial questions: "For most of the conservative students I interviewed, traditional values did not extend to homosexuality ... most are okay with state-sanctioned civil unions for gays." But that's a reflection of the mores of their generation rather than a sign of philosophical libertarianism, which appears to command as few Hipublican adherents as Kirkian conservatism does. "We have to use any

and all means to defend ourselves from the terrorists, who hate the American way of life even more than the French and Germans do," one "mildly libertarian" Cornell student told Anderson.

The odd nose ring or purple Mohawk notwithstanding, these students are best understood not as Hipublicans or South Park Conservatives but as something altogether more prosaic—College Republicans. With over a quarter of a million members and chapters on nearly 1,200 campuses, the College Republicans are the superpower of the student Right. No other organization has comparable reach or influence, though a few nonpartisan conservative groups, such as the Leadership Institute and Intercollegiate Studies Institute, do have campus affiliates. The predominance of the CRs predictably gives college conservatism a partisan slant—a CR chapter is an unlikely place to find criticism of Bush from the Right. What's more, the CRs naturally put a low premium on encouraging students to read the canon of intellectual conservatism—whose works, after all, are more concerned with history, literature, and philosophy than with practical politics. From the point of view of a campus activist, "Why should I spend my time reading about Albert Jay Nock or Irving Babbitt, when I could be out changing the world?" asks Emporia State University Professor Gregory Schneider, a historian of the conservative youth movement.

Promoting the party's candidates and officeholders—and, by extension, their policies—is the College Republicans' *raison d'être*. For most CR chapters that entails steadfast support for the Iraq War. To coincide with the president's State of the Union address in January, the College Republicans National Committee organized "Finish the Job! Support Our Troops!" rallies on 130 campuses and in Washington. Pro-war and pro-administration lecturers like John

Ashcroft and David Horowitz are among the most popular CR-sponsored campus speakers. Horowitz's hawkish arguments made an especially strong impression on students attending the CR national convention last year. "This isn't an invasion of Iraq, it's a liberation—as David Horowitz said," one attendee insisted to *Nation* reporter Max Blumenthal.

So gung-ho are the CRs for liberating Iraq, their enthusiasm sometimes crosses party lines: in July, the Princeton College Republicans offered members a chance to campaign for pro-war Sen. Joseph Lieberman in his Democratic primary fight against Ned Lamont. Yet there are at least a handful of antiwar CRs scattered across the country. James Lawrence was one; he learned the *Broadside* was looking for a new editor from an e-mail sent through the NC State CR list. Joseph Grigoletti, a sophomore at the University of Illinois-Springfield, is another. Like Lawrence, he's been called a "left-wing loony" by other conservative students for his views on war. "Most College Republicans," he says, "have never heard of Richard Weaver or Russell Kirk."

THE PRINCETON COLLEGE REPUBLICANS OFFERED MEMBERS A CHANCE TO CAMPAIGN FOR PRO-WAR SEN. JOSEPH LIEBERMAN IN HIS DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY FIGHT AGAINST NED LAMONT.

There was a time, before the College Republicans became the biggest and often the only conservative group on campus, when students on the Right could be expected to know who Kirk and Weaver were. Young Americans for Freedom, the pre-eminent conservative youth adjunct of the Goldwater and Vietnam eras, was activist in orientation. But it included an intellectual component strong enough that members could

identify the brands of conservatism to which they subscribed with such figures as Kirk, Ludwig von Mises, Ayn Rand, and Frank Meyer. And even earlier, the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists, the first national conservative student organization, unabashedly emphasized ideas over politics.

In a sense the modern Right began as a youth movement in the person of William F. Buckley Jr. When the 26-year-old Buckley published *God and Man at Yale* in 1951, the pre-war Old Right was very old indeed. Its spiritual exemplar, Albert Jay Nock, had died six years before. Frank Chodorov, evangelist of Nock's gospel, was 64 and within a decade would suffer a career-ending stroke, a fate that had already befallen H.L. Mencken. These cantankerous individualists were neither a movement nor, arguably, conservative. But they were the vanguard of opposition to the welfare state—and the warfare state, too. By the '50s, their tradition was in need of a new voice. With Buckley, whose book called for Yale to purge its Keynesians and fellow travelers and whose father had been an ardent America Firster, it seemed to have found one.

Buckley became the axis around which newly devised conservative institutions could spin. One of the first of these was the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists, conceived by Frank Chodorov in the early 1950s as an alternative to influence Intercollegiate Socialist Society founded by Jack London. Chodorov invited Buckley to become titular head of this effort, which would establish a lecture bureau—at

first, just Chodorov and Buckley—and distribute literature extolling economic individualism. A third organizer, 29-year-old E. Victor Milione, a Roman Catholic (like Buckley) whose thinking had been informed by Jacob Burckhardt, would bring to ISI an increasingly traditionalist emphasis.

Within a decade, some 30,000 students had been involved with ISI. By design, the organization appealed to a self-selective elite, of whom “nothing is required ... other than that they read the literature,” Chodorov wrote. “Among the books ISI distributed to students, free of charge or for a minimal fee,” Gregory Schneider notes in *Cadres for Conservatism*, “were Hayek’s *Road to Serfdom*, Felix Morley’s *Freedom and Federalism*, Richard Weaver’s *Ideas Have Consequences*, and Buckley’s and Brent Bozell’s *McCarthy and His Enemies*.” Chodorov hoped that through ISI, “the individualist would become the campus radical, just as the socialist was forty years ago, and the halo of intellectualism would descend on his brow.”

Yet for all of ISI’s success, another group would become the face of the campus Right in the 1960s. Once again, Buckley was present at the creation: the organizational meeting for Young Americans for Freedom was held at his family home in Sharon, Connecticut over Sept. 10–11, 1960. The gathering brought together students and young activists from a plethora of other organizations, including ISI and the Young Republicans, at the instigation of Doug Caddy—who as a Georgetown University School of Foreign Service student had created the nationwide Student Committee for the Loyalty Oath with George Washington University student David Franke—and fundraising guru Marvin Liebman. YAF was to be an activist group, an explicitly conservative alternative to the Young Republicans then dominated by their Nelson Rockefeller wing. Out of

the meeting came not only YAF but also the Sharon Statement, a credo for the group drafted by M. Stanton Evans, 27-year-old editor of the *Indianapolis News*. The Sharon Statement was an early example of Cold War conservative orthodoxy, combining staunch anticommunism with the economics of classical liberalism.

Early YAFers took their ideas and principles seriously. So much so that from the beginning there was tension between YAF’s anticommunist and tra-

dered when a libertarian student burned his draft card—or rather, a convincing facsimile—on the convention floor. Fusionism became fission as the radical libertarians split from YAF. Some YAF chapters switched affiliation to the newly formed Students for Individual Liberty or the California Libertarian Alliance. Yet YAF’s dwindling momentum and membership in the ‘70s owed less to the libertarian schism than to the decline of campus activism in general, according to Gregory Schneider. And as

THE **BATTLE OF IDEAS** THAT SIMMERED IN YAF’S EARLY YEARS BECAME A **BATTLE OF FISTS** AT THE ORGANIZATION’S 1969 CONVENTION IN ST. LOUIS, WHERE BEDLAM ERUPTED WHEN A **LIBERTARIAN STUDENT BURNED HIS DRAFT CARD**.

ditionalist side and its libertarians. The word “God” only made it into the Sharon Statement by a narrow vote of 40–44. Before long, the *New Individualist Review*, a libertarian student journal at the University of Chicago, was questioning the military measures implied in the Sharon Statement’s anticommunism. From the other direction, traditionalist Notre Dame Professor Gerhart Niemeyer objected to the document’s classical liberalism, which he believed, “divorced the public order from the historical world of Western culture, positive law from natural law, political theory from religion.” But for almost a decade, the center held: membership soared, chapters proliferated, and YAF played a crucial role in securing the 1964 Republican presidential nomination for Barry Goldwater.

War in Vietnam and the campus unrest accompanying it finally drove a wedge between YAF’s conservatives and radical libertarians. The battle of ideas that simmered in YAF’s early years became a battle of fists at the organization’s 1969 convention in St. Louis, where bedlam

the conservative movement became institutionalized in Washington, YAF increasingly came to resemble the College Republicans. There was room in the movement for only one youth adjunct to the GOP, and it wouldn’t be YAF.

Then as now, there were few outright antiwar conservatives—as opposed to libertarians—on campuses. All along, YAF had been supportive of the Vietnam effort. The student Right of the ‘60s was well-read compared to the Sean Hannity generation, but what it had been reading was *National Review*, whose steady broadsides against the antiwar Left were more than enough to compensate for any doubts the works of Richard Weaver might have sown. (Weaver himself died in ‘63, too soon to address the conflict in Indochina.) The Kennanesque realist conservatism of Robert Nisbet and John Lukacs, meanwhile, was still developing; neither man’s stature as a giant of the postwar Right was yet indisputable. As for the anti-interventionist Old Right, it “was pretty much forgotten,” according to Schneider. “There wasn’t really this sense that

Albert Jay Nock or John T. Flynn had any bearing on [YAF's] thought at all."

One exception was David Franke. "He told me that one of the things that drew him to conservatism was John T. Flynn," Schneider relates. Franke didn't oppose the war, but he did come out against the draft in 1967, and as editor of YAF's journal, *New Guard*, he commissioned anti-conscription essays from libertarians and traditionalists alike, including Russell Kirk. He won over the group's national board: at the '69 convention, although a radical libertarian proposal to support draft resistance was defeated, YAF did endorse a call to end conscription. But the draft was a separate issue from the war, however intimately linked they were. Franke later stated what, more than anything, sus-

war because "it's anti-Left." Moreover, "students are coming into the conservative movement without the intellectual grounding, with no real basis for disagreeing with popular politicians" like President Bush.

In making his case against the Iraq War to conservative students, Flynn argues that "it wasn't a liberal/conservative issue," pointing to antiwar conservatives and pro-war liberals. He also recommends re-examining conservative principles: "I would look back to the Sharon Statement"—with its emphasis on "America's just interests"—"as a clear and succinct statement of what the conservative attitude to foreign affairs is." But Flynn doubts whether the canon of intellectual conservatism provides much guidance for today's foreign policy: "The

can Cause that the Iraq War was indeed grounded in conservative philosophy. Hillsdale College junior Matthew McCorkle thought otherwise on the basis of Kirk's *Roots of American Order*—"My impression is that Iraq doesn't have those roots," he said.

Are both readings equally valid? Students who delve deeper into Kirk's life and work will find an answer. While he never openly dissented from the Cold War, Kirk left little doubt about his feelings toward more recent foreign-policy developments, saying at the time of the first Gulf War, "Not seldom has it seemed as if some eminent neoconservatives mistook Tel Aviv for the capital of the United States." Young conservatives who turn to George H. Nash's *Conservative Intellectual Movement in the United States Since 1945*, meanwhile, will discover Kirk writing in a 1946 letter that "there is no tyranny more onerous than military life" and warning against perpetual war for perpetual peace.

No single work by Kirk or Weaver or even Robert Nisbet—whose last books, *Conservatism: Dream and Reality* and *The Present Age* are strongly anti-militaristic—makes a comprehensive case against preventive war and interventionism. A casual acquaintance with the conservative canon wouldn't change any College Republican's mind. But students who seek a fuller knowledge will find little in the conservative intellectual tradition that accords with George W. Bush's view of the world and America's place in it. Increasingly, conservatives over the age of 65—including George Will, Milton Friedman, Jeffrey Hart, and Bill Buckley himself—have come to see the Iraq War as folly. If students critically engage the works of the wisest men of an even older Right, they too may be forced to conclude that George W. Bush is no conservative all—or else that Kirk and Weaver, like James Lawrence, are really leftists. ■

STUDENTS WHO SEEK A FULLER KNOWLEDGE WILL FIND LITTLE IN THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL TRADITION THAT ACCORDS WITH GEORGE W. BUSH'S VIEW OF THE WORLD AND AMERICA'S PLACE IN IT.

tained conservative students' support for the fight: "Because SDS and the Leftists were against the war in Vietnam, [Lyndon Johnson] effectively got Republicans and conservatives to back him in waging it."

Much the same holds true today for the war in Iraq, according to Daniel Flynn, author of *Why the Left Hates America* and a man of wide acquaintance with the student Right as a campus lecturer and former organizer with Accuracy in Academia and the Leadership Institute. Flynn himself is a critic of President Bush's foreign policy: "I gave a speech the night the war broke out, at St. John's College in Minnesota. In pretty much every speech I've given since then I'd mention my opposition to the war in Iraq." In his experience, the campus Right is overwhelmingly pro-

present historical situation is new. Even 20 years ago, no one would have thought of having these humanitarian interventions. If you're looking back to Kirk and Nisbet, I don't think you're going to find a whole lot. It wasn't an issue because there was little demand for intervention from the Left or the Right."

Yet it can be surprising just how much effect reading Russell Kirk, for example, can have on students' ideas about war and foreign policy. The *New York Times* provided a case in point on July 31, in a story reporting on a Kirk seminar organized by Young America's Foundation, a student-oriented conservative nonprofit. The piece suggests both the relevance and ambivalence of the canon. One student, University of Baltimore senior Ann Lightle, concluded from her reading of Kirk's Korean War-era work *The Ameri-*

Homestead Security

Strong communities, not stronger government, are the best anti-terror measure.

By Gerald J. Russello

RUSSELL KIRK once provocatively suggested that national defense was as much a responsibility of state and local governments as of the national government, where the Constitution formally lays the responsibility. “We are told,” he wrote in 1963, in words echoing the current arguments of those supporting rigorous action in the war against terrorism, “that effective preparation cannot be attained under our present constitutional structure.” Kirk did not believe that protection against the nation’s enemies required constitutional innovation. What was lacking, he thought, was faith, a decade and a half after the end of World War II, in the ability of states and localities to participate in their own defense. During the Cold War, with large standing armies facing one another across Europe and inter-ballistic missile systems co-ordinated from Moscow and Washington, such a proposal seemed quixotic—another of Kirk’s nostalgic flights of fancy—and the suggestion went nowhere. Various elites found dealing with a compliant Washington preferable to 50 contentious legislatures.

The past 40 years have been good for those same elites. The Eisenhowerian military-industrial complex combined more easily than anticipated—except perhaps by Eisenhower himself—the Progressive-era belief in the saving power of experts armed with the latest social-science research and technology with the nation’s residual Puritan moralism, now transferred from neighbors and pulpit to nation-state and talk-show host. In the process, a political class dependent on both industry and the military

grew cemented in the Beltway to serve the needs of the national-security state. Conservatives were largely complicit in this move and compromised on principle when it was politically expedient to do so. As Robert Nisbet wrote at the time, some conservatives were “less interested in Burkean immunities from government power than ... in putting a maximum of governmental power in the hands of those who can be trusted.” So long as they are our SOBs, as the saying goes. Well, we know how that turned out.

The welcome with which some conservatives have greeted advances in surveillance and information-gathering technologies is merely the most recent chapter in this story. As long as corporations gather and manipulate personal data to serve consumers, and it is not placed in government hands, conservatives, with few exceptions, have uttered little protest. This stance, if it were ever valid, is so no longer. The lines between government and private industry in these areas are largely illusory: the laws guiding government surveillance, for example, are outdated and permit government to hire private parties to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. And some companies are all too eager to share private information with the government in the hope of being thought of as upstanding corporate citizens, to the detriment of actual, human citizens. Authors such as Richard O’Harrow in his recent *No Place to Hide*, have detailed the nightmares that can result from our easy trust in how our masters will use the information they gather. Those who innocently believe they have

nothing to fear if they think they have nothing to hide simply make the road to the Total Information Awareness society that much easier.

Any remaining animus that conservatives held toward the extension of government power has largely evaporated in the shadow of Sept. 11. The war against terrorism has reinforced the trust many movement conservatives feel toward government, so long as they believe their guys are in charge and are going after the right bad guys. Conservatives have generally supported the Patriot Act, warrantless domestic surveillance, secret CIA facilities, Guantanamo Bay, and the other apparatus of homeland security as legitimate intrusions into civil liberties justified by the new exigencies in the war on terrorism. In light of the Supreme Court’s *Hamdan* decision, which applied the Geneva Conventions to military tribunals of unlawful enemy combatants, some conservatives have gone further. *Hamdan* was a bad decision, reflecting the Court’s liberal elitism and disdain for the Anglo-American constitutional tradition. But the conservative reaction has not been much better, with pundits parsing the nuances of water boarding from comfortable editorial offices and braying that the Congress should approve “methods short of torture,” or in the words of the *Wall Street Journal*, “aggressive interrogation.” As the Old Right conservative writer Garet Garrett put it in 1940, when criticizing FDR’s proposal for “measures short of war,” such proposals are sometimes only delaying tactics: “The people believed what the Government said, that it was

keeping them out of war by measures short of war, and when measures short of war had led to acts of war they could sooner be persuaded to condone a policy of subterfuge and degradation of law than to accept all at once the status of belligerency." In other words, "methods short of torture" may slip into actual torture to win the war and will then be presented to the American people as a *fait accompli* or necessary measure.

Kirk and other traditionalist conservatives suggest a different view. In advocating federalism even in the area of national security, Kirk was not arguing that each state provide its own army or independently assess threats to the entire nation. Rather, he believed that the states and localities were closer to their citizens and better able to manage security risks than a central government. With local governments and even informal associations such as neighborhoods, it is the citizens themselves who are keeping an eye on their own safety and that of their neighbors. The emphasis on the local has the intended corollary effect of protecting us against the bureaucrats, consultants, and experts who think they know better but who know little or nothing about the nature of the communities that actually make up the nation.

A traditionalist approach to security has at least the following elements. First, it is geared to a human scale. Kirk wrote in *Prospects for Conservatives*, that there was nothing wrong with paternalism, so long as it is local, and that the key to American prosperity and liberty was its avowedly local nature. "The farther charity is removed from local communities, the less democratic it becomes; the further the constitutional delimitation of powers is ignored, the more menacing the centralized state looms." As with charity, so too with security. Those following a traditionalist argument prefer to place trust in those we know and to create for ourselves a

thick network of friends and neighbors.

Second, security is not to be subservient to an ideology. Too often, and especially for the last five years, American elites have tried to equate the experiences of a secure democracy with a reason to export it abroad. Nisbet saw the danger in this attitude 40 years ago. Democracy, he wrote in 1961,

soon becomes a victim of its own war propaganda. It then tends to attach to its own cause an absolute value which distorts its own vision on everything else. Its enemy becomes the embodiment of all evil. Its own side, on the other hand, is the center of all virtue. The contest comes to be viewed as having a final, apocalyptic quality. If we lose, all is lost; life will no longer be worth living; there will be nothing to be salvaged. If we win, then everything will be possible; all problems will become soluble.

Conservatives used to understand that this apocalyptic attitude was a recipe for bigger government. The current war effort, given that it has no clear boundaries, defined enemies, or conditions we would recognize as victory, provides an endless supply of reasons to expand government power. War and government restraint do not go well together, as even a bare sampling of the large antiwar conservative literature attests. A localist understanding of security, in contrast, tends to blunt ideological fervor by rooting things closer to home and by placing concern for one's own first. If the human intelligence the armchair generals are always crying for the government to get in the Middle East will work there, the same principle applies with greater force in this country. Prying neighbors, in other words, may be better at keeping one another secure than eyes-in-the-sky or corporate security programs.

Of course, no one is advocating going back to some (perhaps imaginary) halcyon era before technology arrived and ruined everything and relying solely on grandmothers sitting on their porches. And the kind of neighborhood-centric ethic Kirk represented of course will not stop all threats or a determined enemy. The Founders knew what they were doing when they acknowledged that threats to the nation must also, and primarily, be addressed at the national level. But what Kirk and other conservative thinkers such as Nisbet and, more recently, right-wing iconoclasts such as Bill Kauffman, do offer is an understanding of technology and community that is different from the mainstream—conservative or liberal. They part with conservatives by not placing their trust in either the market or the government to provide security; each has incentives—the private corporation to profit, the government to power—that do not always coincide with the protection of citizens. And they part company from liberals by placing trust in communities to police their own behavior in dealing with outsiders.

A re-conceptualization of security based on local connections and disdain for centralization brings the immediate, and usual, objections that the traditionalist vision implies exclusion, discrimination, and the like. These are appropriate concerns, but they need to be placed in the larger context. As the absence of attacks on immigrants after Sept. 11 demonstrated, most Americans can tell the difference between friend and enemy. The question is not whether we choose to be protected but by whom and with what compromise of our civil liberties. The American conservative tradition has squarely left many of those decisions with the people themselves. ■

Gerald J. Russello's book on Russell Kirk will be published next spring by the University of Missouri Press.

The King and Us

Thailand's stability is rooted not in democracy but in monarchy.

By Jim Pittaway

THE COUP IN THAILAND provided another opportunity for the Bush administration "Democracy Internationale" to demonstrate its tin ear. From a baseline of zero understanding of Thai society, politics, and culture, it would seem reasonable to question military overthrow of an elected government, but all accounts point to royal involvement and even approval of the coup, and this should cause prudent diplomats to probe a little deeper before going public with denunciations and threats. In fact, there is far more than meets the uninitiated eye here, and the administration's rush to judgment may hurt our foreign-policy interests more than our Templars of Democracy could imagine.

The only redeeming feature of this episode is that it provides a case study in the triumph of ideology over principle, reason, and facts on the ground—not to mention national interest. It is ironic that a regime that came to power when another branch of government decided the outcome of a popular election should be so quick to judge when, in another country, the institution that embodies legitimacy and national identity is compelled to remove an elected but less than legitimate government that threatens national interests.

In the struggle against global chaos, of which terrorism is a mechanism, the goal is stability, which is achieved through legitimacy of governance. In this analytical construct, democracy is a means to an end, while legitimate governance is the end itself. You would think that some of this might have been learned through the

miseries spawned by "scientific socialism," another kind of means regrettably confused with a universally applicable end. But here we go again.

The utility of this construct becomes apparent when applied to Thailand (which, for historical depth of field, we will call Siam) and its far less fortunate Southeast Asian neighbors. In our modern era, Siam has hosted millions of refugees from every country on her borders fleeing chaos in their homelands. By contrast, there are not now, nor have there ever been, refugee camps anywhere in the world hosting Siamese people. This is important information that leads to the right question, which is why. What do the Siamese have going for them that their neighbors lack?

One piece of the answer is that all of Siam's neighbors were incorporated into western colonial empires while Siam retained her independence and, most importantly, continuity of legitimate institutions. Job one of colonial predators was the destruction of persons, systems, and institutions that embodied indigenous legitimacy so that populations and resources could be exploited without organized opposition. The chaos that characterizes the post-colonial histories of Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Malaya, contrasted with Thai stability, can be directly attributed to the absence on one hand, and presence on the other, of systems of legitimate governance destroyed by imperial powers wherever they ruled. The Siamese monarchy and its survival is a precious commodity that deserves to be studied.

The current king, Bhumipol, is the ninth in a dynasty that began in the late 18th century. After the Burmese sack of the Siamese capitol of Ayyudhya, Siam suffered turmoil roughly contemporary with our own revolution. A conclave of Siamese mandarins, nobility, and military leadership elected as monarch one General Chakri, who established his capital at Bangkok. He was invested as Rama I, and his reign re-established peace and order within contiguous territories that remain virtually unchanged today. Rama I was a gifted leader who fashioned a governing system coherent enough to successfully resist the colonial powers devouring every other nation in the region. He also established diplomatic ties with the Jefferson administration, inaugurating a 200-year relationship with the United States.

In the 1840s, the fourth Chakri king, Mongkut, refined Siamese ability to manipulate European powers into a doctrine that permanently kept them out. We know him from "The King and I," which trivializes him but does point to his wise decision to see to it that children of elites in Siam were provided with European and American educations. This stands in sharp contrast to his colleagues in Burma, Japan, and China, who were in various states of denial regarding the Europeans and the changing environment. Not only did the Chakri kings keep their heads, while all others around them were (literally) losing theirs, Siam adapted, benefited, and prospered in the age of European empire.

Mongkut's son Chulalongkorn enjoyed a long and prosperous reign. He brought

Siam into the modern world, establishing industries, building roads, waterworks, hospitals, and other public infrastructure, and rationalizing government ministries and the army. Siam entered the 20th century stable and secure, a productive and constructive autonomous member of the community of nations. Dynastic legitimacy was not something demanded or hoped for; it was firmly grounded in a century of remarkable stewardship and good governance in complex, dangerous times.

A Siamese looking at the blood-drenched 20th century might be excused for self-satisfied smirking. So well had the palace learned the great game of power politics that in the wars and revolutions that killed hundreds of millions in surrounding countries, the total number of Siamese casualties directly attributable to a century's worth of chaos is no more than a few hundred. A Siamese regiment made a token appearance on the Western Front in WWI, earning Siam a seat at Versailles. More of a folding chair, really, but the ability of the Siamese to avoid bloodshed and wonton destruction in WWII is perhaps the most amazing feat of defensive statesmanship and population protection in recorded history.

If the legitimacy of the Siamese monarchy is opaque to westerners, millions of Siamese owe their survival in WWII to the fact that the emperor of Japan believed differently. It's lonely at the top, and sitting on the Chrysanthemum Throne in 1939, there were not many people who inhabited that very exalted universe. But the King of Siam did. When Japan's generals marched off to build the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere—their universal means for stability, harmony, and progress—they were told that everything and everybody was fair game. But rules applied to the King of Siam, his subjects, and territory. What the Siamese were able to do with this opening was priceless.

Naturally, the tradition of sending Siamese abroad for training and education was extended to Japan after their remarkable performance at Tushima and Port Arthur. So as the Rising Sun ascended in Asia in the late '30s, the Siamese government was "taken over" by a cabal of Royal Thai officers who had trained in Japan and knew how this game was played. (Here is where they changed the name to Thailand, which was regarded as more nationalistic than Siam, which means "black people," at least compared to the Celestials who pinned that name on them a thousand years ago.) In any event, the Siamese talked the Axis talk but scrupulously avoided walking the Axis walk.

After Pearl Harbor, Tojo demanded that Thailand allow the Japanese Army to transit Thai territory on their way from French Indochina to British Malaya. What could have been even more of a problem was the Japanese demand that their erstwhile ally declare war on the United States. Bangkok submitted, but their ambassador in Washington, under instruction from the palace, ripped the declaration off the teletype, locked it in his desk drawer, and spent the rest of the war telling anyone who asked that such a foolish thing never happened.

As the Rising Sun began descending, the Thais quietly appointed a pro-Allied intellectual as deputy prime minister. He contacted the OSS and became the go-to guy for Jim Thompson and his legendary band of agents. By war's end, Thailand was firmly—and happily—in the Allied camp. This angered the Brits, but since Churchill was able to bully and swindle the clueless Truman into abandoning FDR's primary Far Eastern war aim, which was to prevent them (and the French and the Dutch) from coming back into their colonies, they didn't push their luck over kicking Thailand around.

While Albion may judge the Thai's wartime performance opportunistic, if not perfidious, the Siamese counter that they protected their people while the Brits abandoned theirs. One of the most horrific atrocities of the 20th century involved the wholesale roundup of millions of civilians all over Southeast Asia as slave labor at the mercy of Imperial Japanese Army engineers, who rank with Nazi doctors as the most vile perverters of honorable professions. We are aware that Allied POWs were put in slave-labor camps but tend to forget that millions of innocents from all liberated colonies were herded into jungles and worked and starved to death, then discarded into unmarked graves. The horror stories of survivors rival anything coming out of Axis Europe. However, not one Thai subject was allowed to be abused in this way, and survivors from the colonies blame the imperial powers for their failure to protect ruled populations as much as they blame the Japanese. Among ordinary people in that region, this is a very big deal, and every single Thai subject knows chapter and verse how their monarchy protected them. Thus is the coin of legitimacy forged, minted, denominated, and circulated among a people.

In the 200-plus years since its founding, the Chakri Dynasty and the Siamese monarchical system have amassed a historical record of competent governance and responsible citizenship in the world community that is transparent and unique. Of the nine Chakri kings, at least three are regarded by historians as great, and the current king, whose reign is now in its sixtieth year, may well be the greatest of the bunch. He is beloved beyond anything the western mind can imagine, and it is accurate to say that reverence for His Majesty is more than just the glue that holds the Thai social contract together. It is the requisite attribute of what it means to be Thai.

In the years Rama IX has reigned, he has seen fit to intervene in matters of governance a handful of times. These interventions have been radical, necessary, exquisitely timed, and always in the interest of his subjects, who have honored and trusted his choices without delay or dissent. It is clear that the removal of Taksin was done for cause, with great reluctance, and solely for the benefit of the people and preservation of the realm. For Bush administration functionaries to slap this man around as if he's some Third World bozo is as hypocritical as it is reprehensible.

The historical links between the Siamese monarchy and the United States of America are deeper and far more important than U.S. politicians evidently know. The ties established with the Jefferson administration provided American shipping with a port on the far side of the Pacific Ocean. Whalers and merchant shipping confidently operated in the western Pacific only because a haven for repairs, replenishment, and respite was made unconditionally available by the Siamese. America's projection of naval power into the Far East in the mid- and late 19th century was inestimably aided by the alliance with the Siamese, whose U.S.-friendly ports and facilities anchored the sea lanes on that side of the world.

In return, the Siamese benefited enormously from American presence as a strategic counterweight to the imperial powers, an occidental ally who supported their independence and traded fairly with them. As American power grew, so did the benefits enjoyed by the Siamese, who could comfortably avail themselves of American technology, education, and expertise. From the beginning, it was a uniquely symbiotic and important relationship to both nations as they shared significant practical interests as well as ideals like non-intervention, trade promotion, responsible governance, and anti-imperialism.

When our Civil War broke out, Mongkut immediately offered assistance and support to the beleaguered Lincoln administration. The attempt to deliver war elephants to use in the swamps of the James River Peninsular Campaign may cause eye rolling today, but at the time this meant a great deal to Lincoln. Until well after Gettysburg, all of the European powers and our Latin American neighbors egged on the Confederacy, and Lincoln could count international friends on one hand. Lincoln never took his few foreign friends for granted, as diplomatic correspondence from those days amply attests, and the spirits expressed a century and a half ago have animated Siamese/Thai-American relations to our present day.

There have been ups and downs in the course of our alliance, but they have always been resolved without accusations or slurs. Until now. Never has Washington cast aspersions on any action undertaken by a Chakri king; never has anyone been ignorant or stupid enough to publicly accuse the palace of acting contrary to the interests of Thai people. To lecture and threaten the king is more than a presumptuous mistake, it is a diplomatic World Cup own goal that will have far reaching consequences, as any Asia-hand could have told the Bush zealots.

Our democracy crusade is not considered policy, it amounts to nothing more than a sound-byte on steroids, raging through the world in undifferentiated mischief-making. It denies the huge and obvious amount of historical evidence that thugs and crooks and even real bad guys like Hitler can get themselves elected. Bush's thundering proclamations that democracies don't start wars—as he proceeds to start one himself—reveals cognitive dissonance of stunning proportions. And the failure to recognize that elections we have forced upon Arabs are producing one anti-American demagogue after

another is a preposterous evasion of reality. Democracy is simply as good, or bad, as the institutions and ideas—law, culture, concepts of sovereignty, national identity, and personality—that support or undermine the process.

It's worth remembering that the hoopla a few years ago over the Evil Marcos and St. Cory Aquino has been followed by thunderous silence as Philippine elections, as they always do, throw up one corrupt oligarch after another and nothing changes. The Thai people are fortunate that their electoral system only tends to produce crooks, not maniacs. Thaksin's planeloads of loot will fund an exile life of purloined opulence while he scams western do-gooders as some kind of bogus martyr to the rights of man. But he's just another crook who got too big for his britches and threatened the well being of His Majesty's realm.

Electing a crook, however, is unlikely to meet the threshold required for palace intervention, and the king has absolutely no political axes to grind. Thaksin's unpardonable error is that he wanted to demagogue the very sensitive issue of Thailand's southern Muslim minorities and, through confrontation, repression, and slander, turn the discontented into home-grown terrorists while he reaped the political and economic benefits derived from dividing the realm. It's not how legitimate governance gets done, and the king put a stop to it before it got out of hand, just as the Supreme Court of the United States put a stop to the recounts and the divisive demagoguery that surrounded them or the Queen of England put a stop to Gough Whitlam's demagoguery and attempt to take Australia out of the western alliance. It's what legitimate authority does when the commonwealth is threatened and is very much none of our business. ■

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Great Black Hope

Will 2006 be the year of the African-American Republican?

By W. James Antle III

"SMELL IT? It's trash from my opponent. Time to take it out." In his campaign to replace retiring Sen. Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.), Maryland Lt. Gov. Michael Steele has appeared in five television commercials, each filmed against a gray background and featuring props ranging from his now famous puppy to a set of garbage cans. The spots emphasize his one-of-the-guys likeability—and assiduously downplay his membership in the Republican Party.

Steele is the GOP's best shot for electing a high-profile black candidate in a cycle party strategists had hoped would be the breakout year for African-American Republicans. Even he, puppy ads notwithstanding, is an underdog. An Oct. 2 Mason-Dixon poll shows Steele trailing Democratic Congressman Ben Cardin by 6 points; a poll commissioned by the National Republican Senatorial Committee has the race closer but still finds Cardin ahead.

Other black Republicans running this year are faring even worse. Lynn Swann had hoped to ride his local star power as a Hall of Fame wide receiver for the Pittsburgh Steelers to the Pennsylvania governorship in an uphill fight against popular incumbent Democratic Gov. Ed Rendell. But polls show Rendell trouncing Swann by as many as 21 points. Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell is also coming up short in his bid to become the Buckeye State's first black governor. The campaign-tracking website Real Clear Politics gives his Democratic opponent, Congressman Ted Strickland, an average lead of 17 points. A fourth

closely watched candidate, former Detroit City Councilman Keith Butler, lost the Republican nomination for U.S. Senate in Michigan.

In May, the *Washington Post* speculated that Steele, Blackwell, and Swann might make 2006 the "year of the black Republican." GOP operatives and conservative commentators picked up the phrase. "This could be the year that black voters finally send a strong, concerted message to Democrats," wrote conservative columnist Deborah Simmons in the *Washington Times*. "Stop taking the black vote for granted." Armstrong Williams claimed to *USA Today* columnist DeWayne Wickham that "[t]his is the year of the black conservative voice."

Republican National Committee Chairman Ken Mehlman fueled the hype in an interview with PBS commentator Tavis Smiley. "You may remember back in 1992 the number of women who were nominees for Senate, and they called it the year of the woman," he told Smiley. "The same thing is happening this year with African-Americans, and what I'm so pleased about is the majority of them are Republicans."

As the Republicans' already dismal standing in the black community was battered by events from the Florida recounts to Hurricane Katrina, the chairman of the putatively color-blind party has been quick to portray the uptick in GOP African-American statewide candidates as a deliberate strategy. "We've gone from a model of outreach to a model of inclusion," Mehlman told the *Washington Post*. "Outreach is a top-

down approach. Inclusion says, 'Let's find some really good people and encourage them to run.'"

Mehlman and his predecessor as RNC chairman, Ed Gillespie, certainly encouraged Steele. After Steele jumped from the Maryland GOP chairmanship to the state's lieutenant governorship on a ticket with Robert Ehrlich in 2002, he was repeatedly showcased by the national party. At the 2004 Republican National Convention, Steele won a primetime speaking slot and a seat near Vice President Dick Cheney.

When Maryland's senior senator announced his retirement, President George W. Bush and other party leaders turned to Steele. Bush, former President George H.W. Bush, Karl Rove, and former White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card lent fundraising support. So did Ed Gillespie, who signed on as Steele's national finance chairman and reportedly held an event in his own home to raise \$100,000 for the campaign. In eight months, Steele raised nearly \$3 million.

That makes it all the more ironic that Steele is the most coy of the major black Republicans about his party affiliation. When he declared his candidacy in predominantly black Prince George's County, he never mentioned he was a Republican. Neither do most of his ads. His campaign has been criticized for designing "Another Democrat for Steele" signs that some say appear to identify the lieutenant governor as a Democrat himself. Steele complained to reporters—in off-the-record comments

he was eventually forced to admit to making—that in Maryland the GOP label is like a “scarlet letter.”

Ken Blackwell’s task is even harder. He is trying to run as the most principled conservative while simultaneously distancing himself from his state party’s other elected officials. On the issues, Blackwell is anti-tax, tough on state spending, and pro-life—but emphatic that he is “not the second coming of Bob Taft,” Ohio’s embattled incumbent governor. This mix worked in the Republican primary, where Blackwell rolled up 56 percent of the vote against a white candidate backed by the party’s moderate establishment, but has been a tougher sell to the broader electorate.

Blackwell is in many ways the opposite of Steele and Swann. He is an experienced campaigner, having served as mayor of Cincinnati and won statewide office three times—the state treasurer’s race in 1994, elections for secretary of state in 1998 and 2002. Unlike Steele, he had little encouragement from the local GOP. “The Taft-Voinovich-DeWine wing of the party would just as soon see Ken Blackwell jump in a lake,” says David Bositis, an expert on African-American voting patterns for the Joint Center of Political and Economic Studies. And while Swann has struggled with specifics, Blackwell has detailed policy positions on almost every issue.

So why is Blackwell, someone whom Beltway conservatives have long had their eyes on, not doing better? Republican consultant Philip Stutts answers this question with one of his own: “Have you seen Taft’s numbers?” Blackwell’s gambit to distance himself from the man he would succeed has so far failed. With approval ratings hovering around 17 percent, Taft is the most unpopular governor in the country.

“The struggle has less to do with the fact that these candidates are black Republicans,” says Stutts. “The problem

is they are running in the wrong year.” Bositis says 2006’s crop of black Republicans “couldn’t have gotten the nomination at a worse time.”

Bositis questions the whole year of the black Republican concept, pointing out that the number African-American Republicans running for the House is actually lower than in 1994. As for Blackwell, Steele, and Swann, he cautions against GOP leaders getting too much undeserved credit. “The Republicans didn’t just say ‘let’s nominate a lot of black candidates,’” argues Bositis. “The party in Ohio didn’t want Blackwell and in Maryland, who else did they really have besides Steele?”

Other skeptics suggest the GOP’s financial commitment to its black candidates may be faltering. Even Steele has wondered publicly whether his national support might be tapering off. “Will my party be bold in its effort to show that its commitment is different from [the Democrats’]?” he asked reporters in late September. When the RNC announced ad buys on behalf of competitive Senate candidates, Maryland was not on the list of targeted races.

Indeed, Republican minority outreach efforts aren’t always as straightforward as they appear. In his addresses to black and Hispanic groups, Mehlman has repeatedly repudiated the party’s supposed “Southern Strategy” even as Bush and the congressional Republicans rely more heavily on the votes of Southern whites than Richard Nixon or Ronald Reagan ever did. The RNC chairman also claims that without black and Hispanic votes, his party doesn’t deserve to win—even though, as *TAC*’s Steve Sailer has often pointed out, the GOP’s gains among white voters contributed more heavily to their 2004 victories than their much smaller improvements among minorities.

Nor would 2006 be the first time a predicted breakthrough among minority

voters failed to materialize. “Almost every year now is hailed as ‘the year of the black Republican,’” American University professor Clarence Lusane recently wrote. President Bush’s outreach attempts yielded him Goldwater-like percentages among black voters in 2000, with a small increase four years later that evaporated after Katrina. In 1996, the GOP nominated Bob Dole, who voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and Jack Kemp, who has worked tirelessly to court African-Americans, and won just 12 percent of the black vote.

That doesn’t mean that all is lost for the GOP. Even many critics concede that all three of the major black Republican candidates running this year would have been likely to win in a more GOP-friendly cycle like 2002; Steele is still running a competitive race now. And polls have shown both Blackwell and Steele drawing between 20 and 30 percent of black voters—although experts caution that small sample sizes and other factors should keep prognosticators from drawing premature conclusions.

“When I was working for [Louisiana gubernatorial candidate] Bobby Jindal we were polling 20 percent among blacks,” Stutts recalls. “On election day, we got 9 percent. The question is whether those polling numbers will translate into actual votes.” Nevertheless, Stutts says party leaders “deserve a lot of credit from moving from defense to offense” with African-American voters.

It will take a better cycle for Republicans generally to determine whether the Mehlman strategy pays dividends. But as it stands right now, the only African-American candidates likely to win statewide are both Democrats—and the year of the black Republican is increasingly looking like the GOP’s latest 2006 disappointment. ■

Breaking the Silence

The debate ignited by Walt and Mearsheimer gathers momentum.

By Scott McConnell

SCARCELY A MONTH ago, *New Republic* editor Marty Peretz was chortling about how John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt “had a two-week run in the prints and blogs ... and then, poof, they disappeared.” How desperately Peretz, whose magazine last spring published no less than four articles maligning the pair’s essay on the Israel lobby, must have wished this to be true. And how shaken he would have been to see the line snaking around the block outside Cooper Union’s Great Hall, pressing for scarce tickets. For not only had John Mearsheimer not disappeared, he was appearing on a great New York stage with NYU professor Tony Judt and Middle East scholar Rashid Khalidi, debating the Israel lobby with former Clinton aides Dennis Ross and Martin Indyk and the Israeli Shlomo Ben Ami.

There wasn’t a TV crew in sight, and inside the ambiance was middle-aged, those with the tedious foresight to book tickets early. My friend Philip Weiss (whose blog, mondoweiss.observer.com, has the most lucid commentary in America on matters related to the debate topic) pointed out New York publishing superstars within the buzzing crowd. We had, so it seemed, been magically transported to a pre-cable era when essays or books were the ignition wires of ideological politics—except the debate can be viewed at the *London Review of Books* website, where even a computer semiliterate like myself can manage to see it.

The most common tactic of opponents of Walt and Mearsheimer is to falsify or oversimplify their argument,

knowing that the time and effort required to correct the falsehood leaves little room to advance the discussion. The pair are regularly said to accuse “Jews” of being involved in a “cabal” (or, as Marty Peretz put it, they “purported to prove that US foreign policy was run by the Jews for the interests of Israel and Israel alone”). Such was the general tenor of Indyk’s attacks during the debate, and he impressed no one. But M&W’s detractors did score occasionally. Ross argued that while the pair claimed the lobby had helped push the United States into the Iraq War, everyone knows the Democratic Party is more in thrall to AIPAC and its fundraising than the GOP. But, Ross noted triumphantly, if Gore had been elected there would have been no Iraq War. This was clever: to answer it would require a complicated unpacking of the lobby’s influence on Republicans through neo-

pean history professor of British (and Jewish) origin at the top of his field, who has burst from an academic cocoon to become one of the country’s most important essayists in the realm where culture intersects foreign policy. Early on Judt quoted Arthur Koestler in support of the idea that the proper measurement of an argument is in its truth, and that it matters not at all whether bigots might make the same case for their own reasons. Koestler, some 50-plus years ago, had been explaining to American intellectuals that just because there were demagogic and ignorant anti-communists didn’t mean that communism wasn’t a real and evil force. Judt also let drop the bombshell that a major publication (most knew it was the *New York Times*) had asked him if he was Jewish while considering an article from him last spring on the Walt-Mearsheimer essay—his point being that the editors

WE HAD, SO IT SEEMED, BEEN **MAGICALLY TRANSPORTED TO A PRE-CABLE ERA WHEN ESSAYS OR BOOKS WERE THE IGNITION WIRES OF IDEOLOGICAL POLITICS.**

cons and evangelical Zionists as opposed to Democrats—and one feels that Dennis Ross doesn’t really deserve to be lumped in with the likes of Doug Feith and David Frum. But most of the blows were glancing, and Mearsheimer and his supporters got to make effective and subtle points.

Judging by audience reaction, the best lines belonged to Tony Judt, a Euro-

only felt it safe to allow criticism of the Israel lobby in their august pages if his answer were affirmative. He further related that he was told by Amos Elon, the Israeli author, that when Elon had asked an Israeli ambassador of the 1960s what had been his greatest accomplishment, the emissary replied, “I have convinced the Americans that anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism.”

Rashid Khalidi reminded the audience of the general vastness of the subject, which is hardly touched by examination of more discrete matters such as the lobby's role in spurring high levels of aid to Israel or sparking the decision to attack Saddam. America's entire Mideast conversation is tilted in one direction, shaping what legislation is written, how it is interpreted, how experts are credentialed or marginalized, how candidates run their campaigns. On any other political question—abortion, guns, health care—it is understood that there are two sides, but in the United States (and only in the United States), where Israel is concerned there is only one position. One need only note last summer's 410-8 House vote in support of Israel's campaign against Lebanon to realize that Khalidi is correct. Judt put a point on the argument: the "dual loyalty" charge is essentially meaningless in that many Americans—not just Jews, of course—so thoroughly identify Israel's interests with America's that there is really a single loyalty at work, so that skepticism about Israel's policies is thus largely conceived of as un-American and explicable only by reference to dark impulses.

Shortly after the debate, I read that Walt and Mearsheimer have contracted to do a book expanding on the subject with Farrar, Straus and Giroux, a top publisher. This is welcome and surprising news. Last May, a friend well placed in the book industry told me he thought it extremely unlikely that a mainstream house would "take the risk" of signing a Walt-Mearsheimer book; their subject was simply too dangerous.

Of course, the lobby is still trying to suppress discussion. Several days after the debate, Tony Judt was scheduled to talk to a group called Network 20/20, which regularly meets at the Polish consulate in New York. Abe Foxman of the

ADL got on the phone to the consulate, reminded the Poles how much damage he could do to them if he and his friends were to brandish the "anti-Semitism" club against Poland, and "poof" (to quote Marty Peretz again), the consulate called off Judt's event.

There will surely be more of this in the months and years to come. But the cat is now out of the bag, and despite the lobby's best effort to suppress it, there will be a more freewheeling debate about whether America's Mideast policy should be so completely Israel-centric. The subject has simply become too important to ignore. During the Cold War, hawks like myself usually deferred to the Norman Podhoretzes on the Mideast—they obviously cared so much about it—and doves mostly limited their own cam-

paigns to Central America and nuclear weapons. It was always easier to suppress doubts, if one had them, about Israel's brutal treatment of the Palestinians since nothing good for one's career or ability to influence any other cause could come from being labeled "anti-Israel."

But with the Mideast now on the front burner, as even Bush administration officials acknowledge, America will have no allies whatsoever in the war against terrorists unless progress is made towards a fair settlement of the Palestine question; it is shameful to remain silent. Walt and Mearsheimer have opened the door, and others of great eminence have joined them. The Iraq War highlights the price of continued indifference or silence, and the price can only grow steeper. ■

Trouble in the Heartland

In the midterm congressional elections, are Indiana's conservative white men trending Democratic?

By Stewart Nushaumer

BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA—The American heartland begins in Indiana, where the land shrinks and the sky swells and the tempo and temper of the people mellow, foreshadowing the wide-open placid plains. But Indiana is more than an easygoing, conservative doorstep to grassy desolation. In the north are heavy deposits of the Rust Belt, ugly graveyards of the American Dream. In the south are rolling hills with thick vegetation and backwoods poverty. In the center is the sprawling, bustling metropolis Indianapolis. Everywhere is farmland. Indiana is a lot of things, and now something more.

Regardless of the world's finest gerrymandering for political self-perpetuation, seven Republican congressional seats in the Midwest are in imminent danger of falling to Democrats. Nearly half are in Indiana, where Democrats probably have their best chance of sweeping three GOP-held seats in a single state. Since Democrats need only 15 additional seats to recapture the House of Representatives, Indiana voters may play a crucial role in slapping congressional shackles on President Bush.

Only two years ago, these same voters embraced Republicans and stomped Democrats mercilessly—Bush

gobbled 88 counties while John Kerry scrounged a measly 4. Not since Lyndon Johnson in the 1960s has Indiana gone for a Democratic presidential candidate. Now three Republicans are in the election frying pan.

Indiana University political science professor Russ Hanson clarifies, "Although Indiana is a solidly red state when it comes to presidential voting, below that level it's competitive. The current lopsided split in Indiana's Congressional delegation—7 Republicans and 2 Democrats—is atypical. Not long ago it was evenly divided 4-4. But all three Republican seats in play the same year," the professor hesitates, "may reflect the national momentum toward Democrats."

At the Bloomington farmers' market, amongst a strolling crowd under a warm afternoon sun, a t-shirt catches my eye:

"I'm an Illegal Alien, I Demand Your Rights." "Illegals are all over Bloomington," Gary McKee growls. "They don't even bother to learn English." After he lashes out at a list of liberal Democrats—Kerry, Gore, Clinton, Carter—I ask him about George W. Bush. "He hasn't done anything," the retiree concedes, adding, "I'm about through with voting."

Concerned that angry conservatives are "about through with voting"—or worse, are about to vote for Democrats—Republican state Chairman Murray Clark is hustling. "Don't forget that a vote for the Democrats is a vote to give San Francisco more power," the GOP chairman thunders. If the fear of liberal Nancy Pelosi becoming Speaker of the House does not whip conservatives in line, nothing will.

This is red meat for the party's largest and most loyal constituency, conservative white males, without whom Republicans are utterly doomed. In the early 1960s, more than 50 percent of white men supported Democrats; in the following decades their support plunged to 40, 30, even 20-some percent. In 1978, the *Washington Post* reported that 78 percent of white males felt alienated from the Democratic Party. A few years later many became Reagan Democrats. In the 1990s, conservative males were crucial to the Republican takeover of both the House and Senate.

The gender gap is not merely about women voters, who to a greater degree than men are swing voters, but also white men—especially conservative white men, who for the last four decades have been the foundation for Republican victories.

The fear that is gripping Gary McKee is closer to home than Nancy Pelosi. "Where is the RCA factory in Bloomington?" he fumes. "Where is the Westinghouse factory in Bloomington? Otis Elevator? In department stores I can't buy a

shirt made in America. The politicians are selling us out."

A few blocks away in Court House Square, sitting on a bench near the Civil War monument is Russell, "a conservative good ole boy from Martin County." Lighting a cigarette, he explains Indiana is really two states, divided into north and south. He resides in the south.

"There are three priorities for people where I come from," the 59 year-old says slowly. "The meth [methamphetamine] problem—3 out of 4 my stepchildren are on it."

"What?" I try not to shout.

"Yeah, they're grown up," he shrugs his shoulders.

"Second, I would say immigration. I don't think any of them politicians understand how important this is. They think we're all a bunch of hog farmers with air between our ears." His easy grin fades.

"Probably jobs are our number one priority. I worked for GE for 15 years, two years before retirement they send my job to Mexico." He looks into my eyes, studying me. "We worked for years to clean the environment up and get salaries up and now we have to compete with people who s—t in the street and live in cardboard boxes." His grin returns.

The *Herald-Times*, Bloomington's newspaper, writes "economic uncertainty" may affect the outcome of the midterm election. But neither Gary nor Russell sees any "uncertainty" in the economy, and both know the economy will affect the outcome of this election.

"People are getting real tired," Russell stops, "the more folks look at Iraq, the more they see Vietnam. Our National Guard over there really shakes people up. I belong to the American Legion and VFW. It's rare anyone supports this war, but we all support our soldiers."

"How are you voting?" I ask.

"Well, Hoosiers keep that pretty close to their chest," he smiles.

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Thirty minutes south of Bloomington the hills roll higher and the farms grow smaller as the dual highway narrows into a windy single lane. There are house trailers ringed by junked cars and dilapidated sheds. I turn on the radio, AM for some local flavor: *Farm market update...corn...livestock....* Another station: *What is wrong with elites that they don't want the young to learn, the*

Dressed in baggy dark blue pants and shirt, the brim of his baseball cap barely above his eyes, Brian served two tours in Iraq for a total of 19 months. Over coffee our discussion wanders—anger about toll roads, the drug problem—but not for long. “Worst thing that ever happened in this country was when Congress gave the president power to go to war in Iraq.”

BRIAN SERVED TWO TOURS IN IRAQ FOR A TOTAL OF 19 MONTHS. OVER COFFEE OUR DISCUSSION WANDERS—ANGER ABOUT TOLL ROADS, THE DRUG PROBLEM—BUT NOT FOR LONG. “WORST THING THAT EVER HAPPENED IN THIS COUNTRY WAS WHEN CONGRESS GAVE THE PRESIDENT POWER TO GO TO WAR IN IRAQ.”

voice of Rush Limbaugh. Next station: *Is God in your life?* Next station, *Democrats are whining like little children*, Limbaugh again. A bumper sticker on a SUV reads, “Elect Jesus, King of Your Life.” In both terrain and character this is genuine Appalachia, sharing little in common with Indiana’s north.

In the two massive congressional districts sprawling across southern Indiana, bordering Kentucky, both Republican incumbents are on the block. Few people seem to be talking about the election—“interest is just beginning,” I’m told—but the local media is fully interested. In the Bloody Eighth, one of the classic swing districts in the country, the front page of the *Evansville Courier & Press* discusses a poll that has the Democratic challenger ahead; section B has an article on House Speaker Dennis Hastert praising incumbent Congressman John Hostettler on immigration, pointing out that Democratic challenger Brad Ellsworth likewise supports border security and opposes a guest-worker program. As the professor in Bloomington said, Democratic candidates are conservative here if they want to win.

“What does that mean for the midterm elections?” I ask.

“My mom is a die-hard Republican. She has switched and will vote Democrat—Dad too. You know, I got a buddy in Walter Reed Hospital. His left arm and right leg were amputated.”

At Susie’s Bar in the tiny town of Dale, Mark the bartender tells me his son recently returned from Iraq but may have to go back next year. “I now think this war was a bad idea,” Mark says pensively. On the other side of the bar sits Bob, without a son in the military, without any connection to the military. “This war is absolutely necessary,” he roars. Mark informs me quietly that Bob avoided Vietnam by fleeing to Canada; Bob booms that Saddam Hussein had to go.


At the farmers’ market in Bloomington, Gary looked demoralized and drained, watching his community disappear. Globalism was fine for Russell until globalism snatched his job. No John Wayne talk from young Brian; combat killed that fantasy. Saving the world sounded necessary to Mark until his son had to do the saving. The effects

of our national hubris are filtering down, and the pain is spreading.

Yuggies Bar in downtown Jasper has a cozy 1950s decor, great for nursing a Blue Moon with slice of lemon, which is how they drink their beer here, and great for a relaxing afternoon chat. But Fred, a local sitting next to me at the bar, is anything but relaxed. “Can you believe we’re now discussing how we can torture people?” His eyes are sharp and fiery. “What happened to this country? I’m a Republican, but I’m voting Democrat!”

A similar anger ripped through America several decades ago when conservative and moderate men of limited education and means felt neglected by Democratic elites who, they said, did not address their needs, did not even listen to them. So they ditched the Democrats. Are conservative white males now about to ditch the Republicans? Maybe, maybe not. Their rage may only be bluster. We’ll find out next month. ■

Stewart Nusbaumer is retired from the U.S. Marine Corps and is now a journalist based in New York City.



Halt, Christian Soldiers

Evangelicals' militant tendencies aren't grounded in church history or Scripture.

By Bill Barnwell

ON OCT. 3, 2002, President Bush received an open letter from some of the country's most prominent evangelical leaders, including the Southern Baptist Convention's Richard Land, Chuck Colson, Campus Crusade's Bill Bright, and James Kennedy of Coral Ridge Ministries. They argued that a pre-emptive invasion of Iraq satisfied traditional Just War theory and offered their theological support. Their flock followed: in the run-up to war, polls found that 69 percent of evangelical Christians supported the action—10 percentage points higher than the general population.

Because the evangelical caucus provided Bush's foreign policy with perhaps its most consistent support, many in the media and even Christian circles concluded that conservative Protestantism is thoroughly pro-war. But church history reveals a diverse range of opinion over the centuries, and today a sizable number of conservative Christians are opposed to or are at least skeptical of militarism for both theological and political reasons.

There is scant evidence of early Christians participating in the Roman army before the time when church and state relations were wed. One study examining tombstone inscriptions found that only seven graves out of 4,700 examined belonged to Christian soldiers. And church history recalls that these Christian soldiers struggled: in 298, a centurion by the name of Marcellus, a Christian convert, stood before his men, discarded the insignia of his rank, and declared that he was a soldier of Jesus Christ, the Eternal King. He was beheaded for his blasphemy against the emperor.

Prominent evangelical scholar Ben Witherington III, professor of New Testament at Asbury Seminary, said in an interview for this article that while there was probably never a monolithic view on the subject, early Christians were mostly skeptical of militarism as a whole. "What we can say is that before Constantine, Christians really had problems with being involved in the military not least because it required participation in pagan worship with one's legion," said Witherington. He continued, "There is as well evidence that many Christians in the early church were pretty theocratic, believing that issues of justice should be left in God's hands, and that the Sermon on the Mount ruled out Christians being involved in violence of any kind, never mind war." The general consensus amongst Christian scholars, even from non-peace traditions, is that there were indeed some early Christians who served in the imperial army but that their numbers were small, their service was generally peaceful, and that the general attitude of the early believing community was to promote peace over war.

A shift in thinking occurred on many levels when Constantine made Christianity the official state religion. Christians were no longer being persecuted for their faith and the government promoted the use of public funds for the construction of church facilities. Christian teaching was receiving tolerance, if not actual blessing from the state. As time passed, more and more Christians began to serve in the military.

Some time afterward, Augustine began to develop a Christian version of the Just

War theory. It has seen some revision in subsequent ages—most prominently by Thomas Aquinas—but the essence of the teaching remains. According to this doctrine, a number of conditions have to be met before a war is considered just: (1) only legitimate public authorities are allowed to declare war; (2) war can only be waged for a "just" cause (though this was vaguely defined); (3) the right intention must be involved (such as advancing good and avoiding evil); (4) war can only be launched in response to an aggressor, and the action of aggression must be significant; (5) war must be a last resort; (6) there must be a good chance of success; and (7) the war must not produce greater evils and chaos than the evil and chaos being fought against.

As is well known, throughout church history many wars were launched that did not fall within these confines. The Crusades and Inquisitions continue to be a black eye on the history of Christianity, though there was certainly blame to go around for all parties involved. Just War theory was just that—a theory. It did not always manifest itself in real life, and certainly many popes and Christians had little use for it in their political and theological disputes. Indeed, some modern Christian pacifist thinkers have raised the question of whether a just war is even possible given the realities of modern war and its consequences.

At the time of the Protestant Reformation, the Magisterial Reformers—Luther, Calvin, most initial Reformers—were not opposed to using force. In fact, many of them advocated using means of

torture to punish dissidents, both Catholics and other Protestants who deviated from their points of view on everything from Biblical doctrine to political orientation. It is safe to say that the vast majority of Christendom was not pacifistic by any means from the time of Constantine to the time of the original Protestant Reformation.

There were, however, the “Protestants of Protestantism”—the Radical Reformers (Anabaptists and later subgroups such as the Mennonites) who leaned much more towards a belief in nonresistance. Because of their views and theological beliefs, particularly on the matter of adult rebaptism, they were often persecuted and even executed by both Catholics and Magisterial Reformers. While there were some fanatical Anabaptist sects that evolved, the mainstream of the Anabaptist movement was by and large a group of peaceful believers that did not believe in using force to impose religious or political will.

Today a segment of evangelicals remain committed to the ideals of Anabaptism. Not all still hold to their historic peace roots, but a significant number of these traditionalists continue to advocate for nonviolence or at least a less hawkish view on the use of force. More mainline Protestant denominations contain a contingent of Christians who speak out against militarism, but their voices are often drowned out by the larger number of political conservatives whose support for a Republican president has translated into backing for his aggressive foreign policy.

Another allegiance also affects their orientation. The same poll that revealed that 69 percent of evangelical Christians supported the invasion of Iraq also found that two-thirds, “believed they shared the same or similar perspective as Jews when it comes to the issue of ‘Israel and its current struggle against Palestine.” While 56 percent of these

respondents said their support was rooted in political reasons such as Israel’s beliefs in democracy and support for the war on terrorism, slightly over one-third said their support was rooted in a particular view of end-times prophecy that sees the necessity of a reconstituted Jewish state to usher in the second coming of Christ.

Polls are tricky, however, and much is dependant on methodology and wording. A March 2003 poll conducted by the Pew Research Center indicated that while 77 percent of white evangelicals supported military action in Iraq, less than half of this same group said they supported an invasion if America was not backed by its major allies. Without debate, however, many conservative Christians and church leaders loudly supported the pre-emptive strike and they most certainly got more media air time than those in the evangelical community who opposed the war.

Another Pew poll released in the run-up to the invasion showed that Christian clergymen in general were hesitant to oppose the war vocally. According to these results, released in March 2003, 57 percent of churchgoers said that their minister had publicly spoken about the war. Of those, only 14 percent said their minister voiced opposition to the war. According to Pew, “When churchgoers do hear a point of view, it mostly comports with the national stance of their religious faith: white Catholics and African-Americans are hearing anti-war messages, while white evangelical Protestants are getting a pro-war point of view.”

Eventually, President Bush sent the troops to war and the majority of the nation backed his decision, at least initially. After Baghdad fell, the weapons inspectors failed to find WMD, and the insurgency started gaining strength, public will began to wane. Support in evangelical circles has dropped off as well, but many conservative Christians

remain staunch defenders of the administration. In early 2005, Jerry Falwell took issue with a liberal evangelical’s claim that there were many Christians who were opposed to the Iraq War. Falwell called the claim “baloney” and said further, “You could fit your [antiwar evangelical] crowd in a phone booth.” He had written a column the year before entitled “God Is Pro-War.”

Witherington strongly resents the assertion that all evangelicals and other Christians are hawkish or that only liberals opposed the war. After running through a long list of evangelical groups that have historically been skeptical of militarism—denominations in both the mainline and conservative traditions—he states, “This does not in any way deny that the majority of conservative Protestants would not take this view today, but it is misleading in the extreme to say evangelicals are largely hawks rather than doves.”

But if Christianity and evangelicalism have such a strong peace tradition, where did all of the pro-war sentiment come from? John Roth, a leading Anabaptist scholar and author of *Choosing Against War: A Christian View*, says the issue is multifaceted. While many Christians appeal directly to the Bible in such passages as Romans 13, Roth says much of the transformation is due to political and social considerations. “In part, it’s because we are so acculturated ... the primary sense of allegiance is to our nation and secondarily to the worldwide body of believers,” said Roth when interviewed for this article.

Roth also traces a major shift in thinking that occurred after World War I. “World War II seemed to most Christians in the Just War tradition at least early in the war to meet the criteria. It was a popular war, the ‘good war,’ a difficult war to protest or sit out. With World War I there was still a broad-based opposition then [from Christians].”

Both Roth and Witherington appeal to the Scriptures to support their position. Roth says the burden on those who use Old Testament conquest stories of ancient Israel to support their militaristic politics is to consider the teachings of the New Testament and Jesus. Both men claim based on the doctrine of “progressive revelation” that God is best and fully revealed in the person of Jesus Christ, who did not advocate war, violence, or revenge. They also maintain that no nation today, including America, can be correlated with ancient Biblical Israel and that the theological situation today is much different than it was in the books of Joshua and Judges.

Both also critique popular evangelical end-times teachings collectively known as “dispensationalism.” Dispensationalists believe that Christians will be raptured up to heaven before a seven-year tribulation period in which God will pour out His judgments on those left behind. At the end of this tribulation period, Jesus will come back to earth with His people to rule for 1,000 years, after which Satan will have his final rebellion and eternity begins. While dispensationalists are very supportive of the secular nation of Israel, as they believe Israel is central to the return of Christ, most teachers from this tradition believe that two-thirds of all Jews left behind will perish during the tribulation, based on their interpretation of Zechariah 12:8. This has caused a number of non-dispensationalist Christians to call into question the actual support such individuals are expressing for Israel.

While dispensationalist teachings are popular today, it is important to note that they were virtually unheard of prior to 1830. The belief in Jesus literally reigning on earth for 1,000 years has a history that traces back to the early church, but the idea that there will be a pretribulation rapture, and that there are two peoples of God with two separate prophetic pro-

grams (Israel and the church), is not supported by historical theological studies. Interest in dispensationalism increased in 1948 after the birth of modern Israel. Many taught that the rapture would occur within a generation of Israel’s founding based on a questionable interpretation of a few New Testament texts. This teaching continues today in modified form, and while recent polls show that end-times interest is not the primary motivating factor for evangelicals’ support for American and Israeli militarism, it does play a significant role.

A number of evangelical scholars criticize dispensationalists for practicing “newspaper exegesis”—that is, appealing to current events and trying to tie them all into Biblical texts dealing with prophecy. Says Roth, “I do not want to paint with an overly broad brush, but I think there is an arrogance in dispensationalism in that many dispensationalists consider all of human history heading towards us. We are the reason and direction that history has been pointing and that accommodates itself very well to a presumption of militarism that assumes that we are the actors on the stage of world history right now and that we have a divine justification for our actions. There’s a hubris implicit in dispensationalism and militarism that is shared by both.”

“The irony of this is that it is precisely the book of Revelation which repudiates this whole approach [militarism], the favorite book of dispensationalists,” Witherington adds. “This book quite specifically says that it will only be Christ himself, first from heaven and then on earth, who will administer judgment on the world. Christians are not to try to accomplish God’s vengeance for him.” This analysis, taken from a straightforward reading of the Biblical text, calls into question the popular assumptions about a bloody, human-directed, end-times battle of man-made weapons and armies.

As this brief survey has shown, there has never been a consensus within Christian thought in support of militarism. In fact, the peace and Just War traditions have a rich and long practice throughout church history. This holds within all major branches of Christianity and is certainly true within many pockets of the modern evangelical movement. Still there are many Christians, mainly evangelicals, who believe that the only conservative position is the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld doctrine and the broader neoconservative ideals. While the notion that we can, through force, realize some democratic utopia is profoundly secular, supposedly only liberal churches and Christians support peace.

Evangelicals who desire the “more humble foreign policy” candidate Bush promised before his transformation into a “war president” are still a minority. But their arguments pose a valid and credible alternative to the mainstream conservative position. In fact, if the case they make is more faithful to the Biblical text, then it is their position that is indeed more conservative. And as the current war drags on, with new information calling into question the assertions and predictions of administration officials and their clerical cheerleaders, more and more conservative Christians are converting to the gospel of peace.

At the beginning of my conversation with Roth, he stated that too many evangelicals are “used to the idea that they are Americans first and Christians second.” The sad irony is that these believers are unaware that their militarism serves neither America nor Christianity. Indeed, it is the contrarian conservative evangelicals who are truly honoring God, family, and country. ■

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Kill 'Em All Conservatives

Pro-war pundits say: give Muslims liberty or give them death.

By Justin Logan

CONSERVATIVES WHO HAVE aligned themselves with the neocons' Middle East strategy are getting frustrated. It wasn't supposed to be like this. Nation-building and international social work have not traditionally been the stuff of conservative foreign policy. This whole business about democracy and the universal thirst for it seems unnatural. War, after all, is supposed to be about killing your enemies. But in the war currently raging in Iraq, who are we supposed to be killing?

The answer, to the befuddlement of many pro-war conservatives, is almost nobody. Unless we were to level the place entirely, killing is not going to solve our problems in Iraq. As the U.S. military has grown weary of pointing out, there is no military solution to the problems on the ground. But wars are supposed to have military solutions, and the fact that this one does not isn't sitting well with many hawkish conservatives.

National Review's John Derbyshire described his own reasoning for supporting the war and eventual disillusionment with it. Explaining that his initial support for the invasion was "really just punitive," Derbyshire admitted that he doesn't "in fact, give a fig about the Iraqis." But trying to keep two sides apart in a civil war was never part of the deal for hawks like Derbyshire.

The "to hell with them hawks," as Derbyshire's fellow travelers have come to be called, still yearn for this war to become a conservative war—a war of annihilating opposing militaries, of unconditional surrender, of victory and

ticker-tape parades. These conservatives have begun to wonder: why don't we just kill them all?

The first signs of this bloodthirsty ethos emerged during the outrage that most of us suffered after Sept. 11. Ann Coulter explained that we ought not concern ourselves with "locating the exact individuals directly involved in this particular terrorist attack." In fact, she argued, "those responsible include anyone anywhere in the world who smiled in response to the annihilation of patriots." Coulter went on to invoke favorably the carpet-bombing of German cities during World War II.

Most of us felt something similar to Coulter during the immediate period after Sept. 11. But since that time, conservatives have grown frustrated with the complexity of counterinsurgency in the Islamic world. The confusing and ever shifting alliances and tactics coupled with wily opponents like Moqtada al-Sadr have made the conservative commentariat as uncomfortable as the stereotypically stuffy Brit trying to make his way through a chaotic Arab souk. Coulter, hardly sobered by the five years since 9/11, thinks it's time to just bring in the big guns: she told a whooping, supportive audience at Sean Hannity's "Freedom Concert" that we could "carpet-bomb [the Iranians] so they can't build a transistor radio. And then it doesn't matter if they have the nuclear material."

Coulter may be an extreme example, but she isn't alone. Take the February 2005 remarks of Republican Congress-

man Sam Johnson. Playing to a conservative audience, he argued that in the Middle East, "Syria is the problem." And what to do? "I can fly an F-15, put two nukes on 'em, and I'll make one pass. We won't have to worry about Syria anymore." Johnson's statement—which he would later protest was a joke—and his utter lack of evidence for the argument that Syria was the source of our troubles were both alarming, but perhaps still more troubling was the venue: Suncreek United Methodist Church. What would Aquinas—let alone Jesus—say? Something about the sanctity of human life?

Trawling the darker swamps of right-wing talk radio, one can find still more disturbing comments. Michael Savage, who has made a living from notoriety, has remarked in passing that we might "kill 100 million [Muslims], then there'll be 900 million of them. I mean, would you rather die—would you rather us die than them?" For Savage, "smallpox in a blanket ... was nothing compared to what I'd like to see done to these people." Moving more mainstream, Glenn Beck, a CNN host, worried that if "the barbarians" triumph in the Middle East, "we're going to have to nuke the whole place." Bill O'Reilly's geopolitical inclinations led him to conclude that "in a sane world, every country would unite against Iran and blow it off the face of the Earth."

It isn't just talk-radio bomb throwers and cable-news shouting heads, either. Mainstream conservative opinion makers are wondering if we have the steel to slaughter our enemies in sufficient

numbers. Fancying himself the Herman Kahn of the war on terror, John Podhoretz wondered in the pages of the *New York Post* whether “liberal democracies have now evolved to a point where they can no longer wage war effectively because they have achieved a level of humanitarian concern for others that dwarfs any really cold-eyed pursuit of their own national interests.” Podhoretz couldn’t hide his admiration for the willingness of Allied leaders during World War II to “inflict mass casualties on civilians” so that they could “indicate a cold-eyed singleness of purpose that helped break the will and the back of their enemies.” He closed with a dark question: whether the “moral greatness of our civilization ... is endangering the future of our civilization as well.”

Moving from the crude to the sublime, the Hoover Institution’s Shelby Steele found himself wondering why we are losing, given that “no one ... believes that America lacks the raw power to defeat this insurgency if it wants to.” He found a psychological explanation: white guilt. Steele believes that it is the lingering guilt of Western imperialism that prevents us from really taking the gloves off when it comes to brown people: “the white West—like Germany after the Nazi defeat—lives in a kind of secular penitence in which the slightest echo of past sins brings down withering condemnation.”

It would be comforting, but erroneous, to brush off this phenomenon as a fringe subset. It isn’t. Between them, Coulter, Savage, and O’Reilly have sold several million books. They reflect a genuine segment of the conservative base that is increasingly frustrated with the restraint of the Bush administration and the ambiguous nature of the war on terror. Author Michael Massing, remarking on his reporting on right-wing talk radio for the *New York Review of Books*, described his shock at what he heard there:

I was like an anthropologist going out into a foreign land and listening in to those raving right-wing talk shows. It was extraordinary what I learned about how these shows worked, about what they’re saying. You can see how the perceptions of many people in America are molded by them. ... I heard Rush Limbaugh, Laura Ingraham, and Michael Savage say things that made my jaw drop, because of their ugliness, inaccuracy, or extremity.

And one of the ugly ideas that Coulter, Savage, and O’Reilly have been cultivating is the notion that we might just need to attack the Islamic world more viciously and more broadly. In their book *Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political Murder*, Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley describe the four main motives leading to a “kill them all” mentality: convenience, revenge, “simple fear,” and fear of pollution. All of these motives are present to some degree in the purveyors of that mentality today.

In terms of convenience, Chirot and McCauley explain that the aggressors perceive that an “indigenous population is troublesome and cannot be controlled or dispossessed.” At the same time, the population is “militarily weak, so it is killed or expelled.” As for revenge, almost half of all Americans believe that Saddam Hussein was behind the 9/11 attacks.

This perception of an abstract and unitary Islamic enemy has been fueled by the disinformation campaign of neoconservative commentators and the Bush administration. Islamic actors that cause us trouble, we’re told, are part of “Islamic fascism”—which includes a whole host of disparate actors who have in common one thing: Islam. If another attack should occur on U.S. soil, the conflation of the war on terrorism into a clash of civilizations could become all too real.

In terms of simple fear, Chirot and McCauley explain that “nothing stimulates the genocidal impulse as quickly as fear of extermination.” Note that many of the arguments for killing them all are made in the course of explaining that the threat from the Islamic world is existential: it’s us or them. And as for fear of pollution, the authors invoke a “sentiment that a particular group is so polluting that its very presence creates a mortal danger.” All of the four motives appear to some degree in the current climate.

Thankfully, there’s an exceedingly low chance that anything resembling mass political murder would be perpetrated by the United States on the Muslim world. As Chirot and McCauley point out, there are a number of mitigating factors, including international codes of honor and, simply, liberal ideology. The authors marvel nonetheless at just “how easy it is to link hatred of the enemy with an impulse to kill them all—easy even for individuals raised in a developed country with a culture of individual and civil rights.”

To believe ourselves immune to the frustrations of national struggle that have yielded massacres in the past is to take American exceptionalism too far. America incinerated countless innocent Germans and Japanese during World War II, and to the extent we accept the extreme narrative of commentators such as Norman Podhoretz—that we are currently engaged in World War IV—we inflate the nature of the enemy to such staggering heights that we would indeed need to consider such repugnant measures.

Although it is not likely that the “kill them all” impulse will turn into actual policy, it may be used obliquely to rationalize defeat. Donald Rumsfeld has begun to advance the narrative that there is no strategic or material shortcoming in our war policy; rather it is a question of will:

History has shown time and again that if Americans have the patience and the perseverance to see an effort through, no matter how hard or how difficult, that we prevail.

President Bush makes a similar argument, admitting that the endless occupation of Iraq is “straining the psyche of our country.” The emerging narrative is that, if—or, more accurately, when—we lose, it will be a failure not of strategy or vision, but rather a failure of the American people—for giving up too easily. If we only had the steely-eyed bloodlust that war requires, we could have won.

Spencer Ackerman recently described in *The New Republic* how this happened during the Vietnam War, and it is easy enough to see how the lesson could be transferred to the current conflict. Conservatives, in Ackerman’s telling, believed

if only Johnson would allow his generals to prosecute the war with sufficient brutality—mining the Haiphong Harbor, destroying the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and Cambodia—it could be won.

The more the American public came to oppose the war itself, the more the dead-end supporters believed that a desperate, scorched-earth policy could be the only way to snatch victory before the waffling of war opponents sapped the national will.

Either way, in the unlikely event that the Bush administration were to escalate in the Middle East or if the “we should have done more killing” narrative is used to explain defeat there, conservative supporters of the war, led by conservative pundits, are finding themselves wondering quietly—and not so quietly: why not just kill them all? ■

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House Intelligence Committee Chairman Peter Hoekstra has been receiving information reports from an Iranian exile source in Paris

who is believed to be Fereidoun Mahdavi, a close associate of discredited Iran/Contra fabricator Manucher Ghorbanifar. Hoekstra, who has stated his contempt for the American intelligence community, has been using Vaughn Forest, a Hill staffer who has a reputation for right-wing activism, as a channel to the Ghorbanifar circle. Hoekstra recently made a trip to Paris with Forest to meet the source who has been providing information on Iranian intentions in the nuclear field that CIA and DIA analysts consider to be largely fabricated. Unfortunately, some of these reports have been stovepiped to Vice President Cheney’s office through the Pentagon’s Abe Shulsky, who heads up the Iranian Directorate, an office that replicates the disbanded Office of Special Plans that was previously used as a clearinghouse for fabricated and speculative exile reports on Iraq.

The Ghorbanifar information is also disseminated to the intelligence community from Hoekstra’s House Intelligence Committee. Ghorbanifar and his associates have no access to genuine information about Iran, often just repackaging media reports and propaganda handouts from the Paris-based Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), a Pentagon-protected Iranian exile group that is on the U.S. State Department’s list of terrorist organizations. Ghorbanifar and Mahdavi are also reported to be sources for Pennsylvania Congressman Curt Weldon, who advocates pre-emptive war against Iran. Weldon has written a sensational and factually challenged book on Iran that describes Tehran as the number-one threat to world peace.



The United States government’s intelligence community has prepared a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran,

but the White House has decided that it is not “finished” yet and has decided to postpone any decision on issuing it until after the November elections. NIEs are the government’s documents of record on international issues that confront the United States, and they are supposed to be both impartial and definitive. Vice President Cheney’s office has reportedly objected to many of the conclusions in the draft Iran NIE or, more to the point, to the lack of any conclusions that he would welcome. The draft document indicates that there is no solid intelligence confirming that Iran has a nuclear weapons program, contradicting many recent statements made by the administration. It also states that Iran exercised virtually no control over Hezbollah in the recent fighting in Lebanon and that there is little to no confirmed information supporting the oft cited contention that Iran is arming the militias and insurgents in neighboring Iraq. The report ruefully observes that there are plenty of weapons floating around inside Iraq without any assistance from Iran, though it does note, without hard evidence, that Iran could have provided some bomb-making expertise and possibly sophisticated timers and detonators to the insurgency’s arsenal. For what it’s worth, most U.S. intelligence officers working on Iran believe that Tehran is concealing a weapons program even if the proof is lacking.

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Arts & Letters

FILM

[*The Departed*]

Good Will Killing

By Steve Sailer

AS AMERICAN FILMMAKING has hit the doldrums, the best Chinese-language movies, such as "Hero" and "2046," have come to rival in quality anything recently made in America. Now the most critically celebrated American director, Martin Scorsese ("Taxi Driver" and "The Aviator"), has directly taken up the Chinese challenge. "The Departed" transplants to Boston the subtle, laconic 2002 Hong Kong cops-and-gangsters thriller "Infernal Affairs" about a crook who infiltrates the police while an undercover detective worms his way into his mob.

I'm proud to report the Americans have won the face-off. As fine as "Infernal Affairs" is, the loquacious "Departed" is an order of magnitude more entertaining. Our boys triumph the same way we did in World War II—by throwing everything, including the kitchen sink, into the fray. "The Departed," which ends up a sort of brutal action tragicomedy, might be overstuffed, but it's certainly overwhelming.

Few productions can boast three leading men (Leonardo DiCaprio, Matt Damon, and Mark Wahlberg) all at the peak of their games. And then there's Jack Nicholson and his 12 Oscar nominations hilariously chewing the scenery as the diabolical Irish gangster chieftain.

Nicholson made no effort to learn the South Boston local accent, but the ten seconds when he imitates a rat justifies his salary.

Although Scorsese is a favorite of intellectuals, his films, when they work, leave the critic without much to analyze other than why they work so well. A quarter century ago, staggering out of Scorsese's most awe-inspiring effort, "Raging Bull," a friend turned to me and, overwhelmed but genuinely puzzled, asked, "But ... what was that *about*?" You could say "Raging Bull" was "about" masculinity, but Scorsese didn't present a theory of it for you to argue over. He simply showed you the distilled essence of masculinity.

The effectiveness of "The Departed" starts with Boston-born novelist William Monahan's screenplay, with its despair over the bloody-mindedness and its pride in the courage of the city's Irish. While the Chinese film's plot seems like a clever but abstract conceit, here it's a window into a notoriously concussion-centric culture. Indeed, Monahan is clearly influenced by the 1975-90 scandal in which FBI agent John Connolly recruited as an informant a childhood friend from a housing project in Southie (the most notorious white underclass neighborhood in America), mobster Whitey Bulger, only to end up assisting the hit man's lethal rise to the top of Boston's Irish mafia.

Thelma Schoonmaker, Scorsese's longtime personal editrix, somehow keeps the complicated double storyline comprehensible.

Bostonian Matt Damon is wonderfully hateful as the smart, sociopathic kid from Southie whom Nicholson picks to be his mole within the state police.

Leonardo DiCaprio plays the hero, a police academy graduate who is psychologically bludgeoned by his superiors'

good cop (Martin Sheen)/bad cop (Mark Wahlberg) act into agreeing to penetrate Nicholson's gang. DiCaprio failed in his first role as an Irish brawler, in Scorsese's "Gangs of New York," but here stands out, even paired with Nicholson.

DiCaprio has the baby face of a male child star, which he was as a teenager. Adorable little girl actresses, like Elizabeth Taylor and Drew Barrymore, often grow up to be adorable young women, but boy entertainers frequently fail dismally as adults.

Boys are less mature than girls, so producers have a hard time finding talented enough normal lads who can, literally, act their age on screen. Therefore, they search out older boys who can play younger than their real ages. Unfortunately for them, delayed puberty is not what audiences look for in adult leading men.

So, how has DiCaprio survived? By being, intermittently, a great movie actor.

The secret weapon of "The Departed" is that it can afford to relegate a sizable star, Wahlberg, to a small role but then bring him back off the bench at the key moment.

While most actors these days are the offspring of artistic types who took the '60s a little too seriously (Damon, like many current stars, spent some of his childhood in a hippie commune), Wahlberg was a juvenile delinquent from working-class Dorchester, near Southie. Hollywood typically misuses him as a generic leading man—in remakes, he has filled roles created by Cary Grant, John Wayne, Charlton Heston, and Michael Caine, none of whom Wahlberg resembles in the least. Finally, he gets to play a thuggish cop he might have grown up to be, with sensational results. ■

Rated a very hard R.

BOOKS

[*Building Red America: The New Conservative Coalition and the Drive for Permanent Power*, Thomas B. Edsall, Basic Books, 320 pages]

Democrats in the Doldrums

By Martin Sieff

THERE IS SOMETHING strangely dated, even archaic about Thomas Edsall's new book. It is meticulously researched, sober in its conclusions, and balanced in its analysis. It will clearly be flavor of the month in supposedly thoughtful and serious Democratic circles and think tanks. The usual round of worthy liberal panels will convene to debate its conclusions.

Yet the book appears to have been written in a time warp. It could just as easily—and far more relevantly—have been published 25 years ago. And therein lies not only its problem but the entire dilemma of the 21st-century Democratic Party.

Edsall's central thesis is that the Republican Party is running a determined, extraordinarily well-organized and co-ordinated master plan to make it the permanent majority party of the United States for the indefinite future. Well, duh?

The GOP has obviously succeeded in achieving that goal since 1980. In the 26 years since that election, the Republican Party has controlled either the presidency or one or both of the houses of Congress except for the fleeting two-year period between 1993 and 1995. It has usually done so, as Edsall notes, by narrow electoral margins. The GOP has never amassed huge majorities except when Ronald Reagan was running for president or boosting his heir George Herbert Walker Bush in 1988. And even

then, all of Reagan's extraordinary charisma and political skill was unable to break the Democratic lock on the House of Representatives, which stood until the epochal midterm elections of 1994.

It is therefore especially ironic that Edsall's clarion call for Democrats to rally around their embattled cause comes right before a midterm election when the Dems have their best chance at regaining control of at least one of the two houses of Congress, more likely the House of Representatives, for the first time in 12 years.

"It is the argument of this book," Edsall writes, "that unless the Democratic Party finds a way to defeat the Republican 'wedge' issue strategies; radically improves its organizational foundations; resolves its internal divisions on national security; formulates a compelling position on the use of force..." and does a whole list of other mom-and-apple-pie things, "the odds are that Republican Party will continue to maintain, over the long term, a thin but durable margin of victory."

The problem for the Democrats is that, not being entirely the dummies that Karl Rove's caricatures have painted them as, they have recognized these problems for at least 14 years—since the campaign of 1992. But except when they had the unique Bill Clinton to run, it has not done them an iota of good.

National-security issues, it should be remembered, had almost nothing to do with the election of 2000. It was Al Gore's *tour de force* to lose that race, which should have been a shoo-in for him, by an endless number of bizarre, self-inflicted political wounds. In 2004, the Dems chose a standard bearer with a heroic personal war record in Vietnam who had voted for the war on Iraq. His military record was turned inside out, and the inevitable complexities of his Senate voting history—every senator's voting record is inherently complex given the nature and functions of the upper chamber—were torn apart by the GOP attack machine.

In 2004, the Democrats wielded more financial clout than in any previous cam-

paign in their history. There was not a whimper of dissent among them publicly on national security. In Kerry and his rival contender Gen. Wesley Clark, they supposedly had the "credible military leadership" that Edsall recommends. They emphasized Edsall's prescription of "an economic program capable of generating—and generating belief in—wealth." In fact, since Bill Clinton articulated his Third Way in 1992, that has been the central theme of every one of the four subsequent Democratic presidential campaigns. And the party has certainly held together "a biracial, multiethnic coalition" since then, as Edsall urges. In other words, the Edsall prescription has been applied, and applied repeatedly, in both presidential and national congressional campaigns for 14 years. And it has fallen flat on its face almost every time.

The only hope the Democrats have is in a qualifying clause that Edsall apparently entered as an afterthought to his prescription: "Unless the population of the disadvantaged swells." Here, he skates over in seven words what should have been the central focus of his book. Americans have historically been content with what they have in national political leadership as long as it has reliably delivered prosperity and economic security. Only when a far-reaching economic crash—or a genuinely frightening breakdown of public security—occurs will they ditch the governing party of the previous generation and cast it into the political wilderness for decades to come.

Thus the Republicans did not get a whiff of national power for two decades following the Great Depression, and even when they finally made it back to the Oval Office, it was by accepting all the liberal, big-government policies that had become engrained over the previous 20 years from 1932 to 1952. The Democratic-liberal governing consensus only fell in its turn following the epidemic of race riots, other social pathologies, and the bungled war in Vietnam under Lyndon Johnson from 1965 to 1968.

Since then, the Democrats have only made it back to the White House when the Republicans were sunk in the swamp of Watergate and when they ran their only authentic political master—Clinton—in 1992. Even then, Clinton could never have gotten there had not H. Ross Perot siphoned off far more conservative-minded GOP voters than Democratic ones in his campaign against the federal deficit. In those days, a lot of conservatives and Republicans really did believe that deficits matter, as indeed they do.

The long-term Republican hegemony, narrowly-based though it apparently is, is not going to be defeated by Democratic action unless the party proves capable of producing another Bill Clinton, something it has signally failed to do in the six years since he left office. It is increasingly clear that in his political intellect and cunning, Clinton was *sui generis*. Even weighed down by President George W. Bush's policies running up record federal deficits, the worst

balance of payments deficits of any trading nation in the history of the world, the catastrophic war in Iraq, the erosion of power and credibility of the U.S. military, the drowning of New Orleans, and the failure to hunt down Osama bin Laden, the Democrats may yet blow what ought to be a sure thing and fail to regain control of the House in the November elections. By simply pressing the national-security button and activating the pro-Bush phalanx of broadcast,

The Dems have repeatedly shown that they lack the courage and the integrity to open up their party to fresh blood and to launch any kind of genuinely principled broad assault on the disastrous Iraq policies of the Bush administration. On the contrary, would-be party strategic heavyweights like Michael Lind, Peter Beinart, and Will Marshall are trying to preach a new era of liberal interventionism, a fantasy based on the assumption of an American economic strength, invincible

LIKE EDSALL, THE DEMOCRATS REMAIN A PARTY OF DON QUIXOTES.

Internet, and print-media opinion-shakers, Karl Rove is out-strategizing them yet again.

The real problem with the Democrats is their refusal to contemplate the very goal Edsall wishes for. He notes that there has been no significant realignment of American voters over the decades of Republican hegemony. But to effect such a realignment would transform the Democratic Party from what it is today—and what almost all its leaders want it to remain—into something unpredictably different.

The consistent policies by the party's liberal establishment spearheaded by Rahm Emanuel leave no doubt that the Democrats, for all their endless, numbing rhetoric about change, remain determined not to let the possibility of such a realignment even begin to occur within their doors.

The party's leaders eagerly went along with the GOP's highly successful efforts to caricature Cindy Sheehan as an extremist to prevent her from becoming a significant political contender for the party in California. They contemptibly sabotaged Marine Lt. Col. Paul Hackett's promising Senate campaign in Ohio to make way for old party loyalist Sherrod Brown. And they have deliberately starved Jim Webb's Senate campaign against George Allen of funds, though at the time of writing it appears that Allen's own ineptitude may foil the party's calculations and let Webb in anyway.

industrial might, and global clout that has already vanished, though they refuse to see it.

It remains feasible that the Dems will pick up at least one of the houses of Congress in November's election. And if GOP policies lead to either economic catastrophe or military disaster in Iraq or against Iran before the 2008 elections, some Democratic hopeful like Hillary Clinton or even Al Gore could get to sit in the White House one more time. But the Dems' continued obsession with kowtowing to the worst Bush and neo-conservative fantasies in foreign policy as well as their resistance to change at home guarantees that any such victory will be a last, exhausted throw of the dice, doomed to a consequent failure and national repudiation even more sweeping than those that enveloped Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter.

For like Edsall, the Dems remain a party of Don Quixotes, mired in their dreams of a romantic, imagined past, eagerly tilting at windmills that are already crumbling of old age and blind to the real dragons rising up on every side to threaten the Republic they have served so poorly for so long. ■

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[*Bakunin: A Biography*, Mark Leier, St. Martin's Press, 350 pages]

An Enemy of the State

By Kirkpatrick Sale

MARK LEIER sets out to rescue not only Mikhail Bakunin, the great anarchist thinker, but the whole anarchist tradition, which he argues is a pertinent political force today: "The current interest in anarchism," he writes, "is not misplaced or irrelevant." He certainly accomplishes the former and does much to dispel the multiple canards that have surrounded this man, many of them fabricated by Marx and the Marxists, but I don't think he makes much of a case for the latter.

Bakunin, aptly called "the hairy Russian giant," was born to a noble family of only modest means in a village north of Moscow in 1814. As the firstborn male, he was destined for a military career and at 15 was sent to a rigid, anti-Western military school, where he chafed at the arbitrary discipline and the narrow curriculum—much less encompassing than the homeschooling he had experienced before. He gradually learned to resist the system in minor ways and soon lost all interest in formal studies, reading instead in philosophy, history, and languages (none of which were in the official curriculum), getting himself expelled from school in 1834 for poor grades and assigned to barracks on the Polish frontier. He liked that no better, went AWOL after a year, and eventually, in 1836, landed in Moscow, gravitating to a circle of students and intellectuals, most of whom were sharply critical of the repressive tsarist regime.

Bakunin spent the next four years, supported apparently by loans that he couldn't repay and occasional handouts from his family, voraciously reading—English and French Romantics and German philosophers, in particular—and writing for little Russian magazines. This provided the basis for his later the-

ories, but he was not yet an anarchist and like many of his circle saw his task as developing a critique of the tsarist state—though not too openly or the police would be on him. When he left Russia to go to study at the University of Berlin in 1840, pursuing his deep interest in Hegel in particular, he was a highly regarded writer, "in the vanguard," Leier says, "of progressive Russian thinkers."

Western Europe around this time was surging with ideas about freedom and justice and political reform that would lead to the 1848 revolutions, and Bakunin's thoughts took a new turn. He became a convinced atheist and began to think about ways of obtaining liberty in a new kind of state ("Liberty today stands at the head of the agenda of history"). By 1842, he was arguing that "the passion for destruction is at the same time a creative passion," by which he did not advocate violence and terror, as he is sometimes accused of, but only meant that if there was going to be movement toward democracy and freedom, the reactionary state had to be done away with. He was developing a revolutionary position, arguing that it was impossible to reform the state: what's needed "is not only a particular constitutional or politico-economic change, but a total transformation of that world condition."

Publishing this kind of material did not sit well with the German government, and the paper he published it in was shut down, leading Bakunin to flee to Switzerland. But the Swiss government told the Russians that he was there and hanging around in revolutionary circles, so the Russian ambassador ordered him to return home. When he refused, the tsarist regime ordered him stripped of his noble rank and sentenced him to hard labor in Siberia, whereupon he fled again, to Paris, in 1844.

It was a lively, political city at that time—George Sand, Marx, Louis Blanc, Proudhon were all there—and Bakunin fit in with the growing passion for revolution, giving speeches, writing articles, making a name. But as an anarchist, not a socialist: socialists were "more or less authoritarians" who wanted "to organize

the future according to their own ideas" whereas he was for liberty and against authority.

When the revolution came in 1848, Bakunin was on the barricades—Marx said it wasn't the right "stage" and went to London—and was part of the quasi-anarchist Republican government. He was given money by the Republic to go foment revolution in Poland, which he tried, and then to Prague, where he tried again, and then, in 1849, to Dresden for an uprising against the king of Saxony. That revolution, like all the others, was put down ruthlessly, and this time Bakunin was arrested, sent to prison, found guilty of treason, and then in 1851 handed over to Austria where he was once again found guilty. The Russians stepped in and took him to Moscow, where he was imprisoned for the next seven years and finally, inflicted with scurvy and heart problems, sent to exile in Siberia.

By 1861, Bakunin was well enough to plot an escape and managed to get on a ship that ultimately led him to Japan, then San Francisco, New York, and finally London. For two years he agitated and spoke to the radical circles there, then went to Italy, where in 1866 he wrote his basic manifesto, now as a full-blown anarchist. He called for the "radical overthrow of all presently existing religious, political, economic, and social organizations," to be replaced by a society built "on the basis of utmost equality, justice, work, and an education inspired exclusively by respect for humanity," a world in which liberty meant "the absolute right of all adult men and women to seek no sanction for their actions except their own conscience and reason ... responsible to themselves first of all, and then to the society of which they are a part, but only insofar as they freely consent to be part of it." Labor would be social and collective rather than individual, land and resources would be shared equally by all, and women would be the absolute equals of men in all affairs. It was a dramatic picture drawn in complete contrast to the world of Europe at his time—and ours.

In 1867, Bakunin and a small band of followers moved to Switzerland, where

he lived most of the rest of his life. He spent his time writing and speaking, establishing himself as the leading intellectual of an anarchist movement that began to have a wide following, particularly in Italy and Spain, with a solid core in Switzerland. He set forth the basic tenets of the movement—workers and peasants would lead the revolution, not intellectuals; secret organizations might be needed to lead the revolution in repressive places like Russia, not as “commander” or “manager” but as “servant” and “helper” of the people; elections and legislatures served only to put a minority in power over a majority and would be unwanted in a free society; claims about the “necessity” of government were founded on false ideas about the weakness and ineptitude of the people, whereas “the state was nothing other than regulated and systematized domination and exploitation” of them; and Marxists and other sorts of “authoritarian socialists” were wrong to want to take over the state and direct it on their own principles because that would only be substituting one minority ruling class with another.

Since anarchism became associated with the advocacy of violence after a failed assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1866 and attempts by other groups in France and Italy in the next few years—and the idea of anarchist-as-bomber fixed so firmly that it still is dominant today—it fell to Bakunin to try over and over again to set the issue straight, and Leier spends a lot of time laying it out. Bakunin was a revolutionary, true, and a revolution might be met with force by the state it was trying to overthrow—but any violence would be in self-defense, since there was no point in trying to change power relationships and property arrangements by guns and bombs. And before the revolution, it would not serve any larger purpose to attempt assassination or terror, since that would more likely turn the mass of people against the cause rather than to it. “Direct action” is a phrase often associated with Bakunin, implying he was for violence, but the phrase meant for him not assassinations and such but the

opposite of indirect action, which was political reform and representational government—direct as in forming trade unions, calling a strike or a boycott, or sabotage, direct as in “the organization of the forces of the proletariat,” direct as in marches and demonstrations, the burning of deeds and mortgages in public, the refusal to pay taxes.

It was during his days in Switzerland that Bakunin formed the Alliance of Social Revolutionaries, which functioned openly as a political group, with meetings, speeches, manifestoes, pamphlets, all putting forth the anarchist program. That, as Bakunin put it, meant “the abolition of cults” and religion, the “substitution of science for faith,” “political, economic, and social equalization of classes and individuals of both sexes,” land and capital “becoming the collective property of the entire society,” education for “children of both sexes,” a “universal union of free associations...on the basis of liberty,” and the “international or universal solidarity of the workers of all countries.” With this program, the Alliance joined Marx’s International Working Men’s Association—the famous International that for a decade after its formation in 1864 would represent socialists and anarchists of all stripes across Europe.

It was a stormy decade for Bakunin, for he and Marx, though agreeing on much, disagreed on many major points—reformism, the state, the timing of revolution—and their feud, in print and at congresses, was long and bitter, full of false innuendo and slander against Bakunin that has done much to discolor his portrait for succeeding generations. They didn’t even agree about the two communes that were created—in Lyon and Paris—in the wake of the 1870 Franco-Prussian war, both of which Marx ignored, both of which Bakunin went to in support of what he saw as the start of replacing the state with spontaneous self-organized associations of the people.

Bakunin’s last salvo against the Marxists was *Statism and Anarchy*, written in 1873, where he denounced the authoritarianism in Marx’s vision, argued that it was

folly for revolutionaries to use the power of the state, and said flatly that Marx’s idea of the “revolutionary dictatorship” to supposedly express “the will of all the people” was anathema to those who believed in democracy and liberty. But Bakunin no longer had the health and strength to fight this point of view through the International’s congresses, or even to lead the anarchist International, which was created in Switzerland in 1872. Overweight and asthmatic, with a poor heart ill served by constant smoking, Bakunin was increasingly bedridden, and finally died in a hospital in Berne in 1876. (Too bad he could not have known that there would be more people at his funeral service than at Marx’s six years later.)

Leier spends a chapter trying to argue that Bakunin had a significant influence on later thinkers, ranging from Peter Kropotkin and Enrico Malatesta to the Wobblies and Spanish anarchists in the Civil War to Herbert Marcuse, E.P. Thompson, Neil Postman, and A.S. Neill, down to the anarchists gathered these days under the banner of “anti-globalization.” But his evidence here is meager, and in the end the best he can do is say of today’s anarchists that “a reexamination of Bakunin may be useful,” not that any of these people has ever read or studied Bakunin’s voluminous works or were inspired by their libertarian vision.

Leier has served his subject well, and it is good to have another biography (and by a major publisher) that frees Bakunin from the demonizers—the best of the others being probably Brian Morris’s in 1993 and Paul McLaughlin’s in 2002. But as much as I’d like to see it, I’m afraid it is wishful thinking to say that opposition to the nation-state, a desire to do away with capitalism, and a preference for spontaneous free associations of equals play much part in contemporary politics. ■

Kirkpatrick Sale is the author of 12 books, including, this fall, After Eden: The Evolution of Human Dominance. He is the director of the Middlebury Institute “for the study of separatism, secession, and self-determination.”

[*Timothy Leary: A Biography*,
Robert Greenfield, Harcourt,
689 pages]

The Acid Guru's Long, Strange Trip

By Jesse Walker

IN SEPTEMBER 1970, the Weather Underground helped Timothy Leary escape from a federal prison. It wasn't a natural alliance. Leary was a hippie icon, but he usually kept the Left at arm's length, preferring psychedelic spirituality to armed revolution. The Weathermen, meanwhile, came from the most Stalinist recesses of the New Left. Their heroes included Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong, and their methods were aimed less at blowing people's minds than at blowing people up.

Nonetheless, Leary played his new role with gusto, issuing a "P.O.W. Statement" that reads like a parody of revolutionary rhetoric. "Brothers and Sisters," he wrote, "this is a war for survival. Ask Huey and Angela. They dig it. ... To shoot a genocidal robot policeman in the defense of life is a sacred act."

Less than six years later he wrote another essay, this one gracing the less Mao-friendly pages of *National Review*. It was an unrestrained attack on the '60s and its celebrities. The Weathermen who rescued Leary were dismissed (accurately) as a "bewildered, fugitive band of terrorists." John Lennon was accused (less accurately) of ripping off the slogan of Leary's aborted gubernatorial campaign in California, "Come Together." (In fact, Lennon had written "Come Together" to be Leary's campaign song.) Pages of bile were directed at Bob Dylan and his "snarling, whining, scorning, mocking" songs. At one point Leary declared, "Squeaky Fromme stands in a Sacramento courtroom ... for believing exactly what [Dylan] told her in the Sixties" and blamed her

attempted assassination of Gerald Ford on the fact that "she was unlucky enough to have owned a record player in her vulnerable adolescence."

In 1997, reviewing a hagiographic documentary called "Timothy Leary's Dead," I cited those two essays as evidence that Leary was "a con man at heart, the counterculture's own Madison Avenue huckster." Now that I've read Robert Greenfield's *Timothy Leary: A Biography*, I feel a little less confident about that conclusion. The book paints a deeply negative portrait of Leary, but it also reminds us of the context that produced those extraordinarily odd pieces of writing. At the same time, it makes it clear that there was more than a little Madison Avenue in Leary's DNA.

A decade before his jailbreak, Leary was a respected Harvard psychologist known for his work in personality assessment. He was also one of several researchers around the world who were exploring the effects and potential benefits of psychedelic drugs, which still were legal at the time. It gradually became clear that where other scientists tried to maintain their traditional objectivity, Leary was an evangelist eager to spread the good news of acid and shrooms. His new enthusiasm eventually led to scandal, and he happily left Harvard behind. Soon he was preaching the virtues of LSD to every audience he could find, even as the government and the media started to view the drug as the nation's leading menace.

Scholars today generally regard the LSD scare of the '60s as a classic social panic. "Of all the widely used recreational drugs," the sociologists Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda note in their 1994 book *Moral Panics*, acid "is the one taken by users most episodically and occasionally, least regularly and chronically." It certainly poses risks, but the most disturbing rumors about its effects—that it causes chromosome damage, that it prompts teens to blind themselves by staring at the sun—turned out to be false. What's more, the media scare arrived at a time when LSD use was at a relatively low level; the hys-

teria actually faded as the drug grew more popular.

What's fascinating is Leary's relationship to that panic. Leary has written that his best-known slogan—"tune in, turn on, drop out"—was inspired by a lunch with the media theorist Marshall McLuhan, who told him, "You call yourself a philosopher, a reformer. Fine. But the key to your work is advertising. ... You must use the most current tactics for arousing consumer interest." According to Leary, McLuhan even broke into a jingle: "Lysergic acid hits the spot/Forty billion neurons, that's a lot."

Leary was known to take liberties when recounting his personal history, and the McLuhan story sounds a little too perfect to be absolutely true. But the very fact that he tells it shows he was aware of what he was up to, as does his famous claim in *Playboy* that LSD "is the most powerful aphrodisiac known to man." In his book *The Politics of Ecstasy*, Leary commented that if the *Playboy* interview "had been conducted for *Sports Illustrated*, the conscientious interviewee would naturally consider the question, How LSD Can Raise Your Batting Average." Greenfield adds: "In other words, had he been talking to *Popular Mechanics*, Tim would have claimed that LSD could rev up horsepower and reduce engine knock while doubling miles to the gallon. Clearly, Tim Leary knew exactly what he was doing. In America, nothing sells like sex."

Leary's pitches for psychedelics oversold their benefits just as the media's scare stories oversold their dangers. His ad campaign helped fuel the panic and, in less obvious ways, was fueled by the panic itself. Both Leary and his enemies had a stake in the idea that the boomers were becoming the Acid Generation. As the press grew increasingly obsessed with LSD, Leary was willing to ride that wave as he offered a rival narrative of his own.

Sometimes, to be sure, he tried to put the breaks on the hysteria. In 1966, for example, when it looked like a ban on

possessing LSD was on the way, he testified to the Senate that the government should instead create a closely regulated system for people who wanted to experiment with the drug. Greenfield chalks this up to Leary's habit of telling people what they'd like to hear. A more charitable interpretation is that he saw the likely consequences of a black market and hoped to minimize the damage by convincing legislators to adopt a more liberal system of controls. There's little doubt, though, that his ultimate policy preferences were more freewheeling: almost immediately after the Senate hearings, he was rolling out the "turn on, tune in, drop out" slogan in an address in San Francisco.

AT THEIR BEST, HIS LATTER-DAY WRITINGS OFFERED A CHEERFUL, FUNNY VISION OF A POST-INDUSTRIAL FUTURE, LIKE ALVIN TOFFLER CROSSED WITH CHEECH AND CHONG.

You can only ride a wave so far, and eventually Leary plunged into the surf. Busted on minor marijuana charges, he soon found himself facing 20 years in prison. There's no doubt that it was his message, not his rather petty violations of the law, that earned him his stiff sentence. One judge declared, as he ruled that Leary should be held without bond, "He has preached the length and breadth of the land, and I am inclined to the view that he would pose a danger to the community if released." When Leary attempted an appeal, a DA argued to another judge that imprisoning him would prevent him from spreading his "messianic ideas about psychedelic drugs to young people." Like the bottled goose in the Zen parable, it was words that got Leary into jail, and it was words that would get him out again.

Hence the "P.O.W. Statement" and the screed in *National Review*. Those two essays were radically opposed not just to each other but to everything Leary seemed to stand for before his imprisonment. But they were written for the

same reason: to win his freedom. As Leary's friend Robert Anton Wilson told Greenfield, "The letter for the Weather Underground when they broke Tim out of jail was the dumbest thing he ever wrote. But that was the price of getting out of prison. Writing propaganda for the Weathermen."

And the *National Review* piece? It came half a decade and several lifetimes later, after Leary had passed through a topsy-turvy exile in Algeria and Switzerland and returned to the American penal system. Passed over for parole, Leary wrote the story when he realized that, in Greenfield's words, "unless he could persuade those in power that he really did hate the sixties, he might never get

out of jail." Sure enough, U.S. Attorney John Milano offered the essay as evidence to the parole board that the prisoner really was rehabilitated. In April 1976, the same month the article appeared, Leary was freed. (One of his books reprints the piece with all the '60s-bashing excised and with a paragraph praising Dylan inserted instead. In the introduction, Leary apologized for his earlier tone: "at this time I was alienated, a bit daft and given to occasional fits of irritation ... I particularly regret my whining complaints about Bob Dylan.")

Greenfield covers most of this in intense detail, but there are two substantial problems with his book. One is that Leary's ideas are almost entirely absent from it. Leary could be wrongheaded or incoherent, but he could also be sharp-witted and prescient. Even his bizarre contribution to *National Review* had some genuine insights hidden among the bile. In a speech last year, Eric Garris, webmaster for LewRockwell.com and Antiwar.com, recalled an address Leary delivered at the 1977 convention

of the Libertarian Party. In Garris's words, the doctor described "a network that would connect computers worldwide, allowing participants from around the globe to sign on and retrieve text, photographs, audio and video instantaneously, and to communicate in realtime with anyone in the whole world who also had a computer and a connection." At the time, Garris noted, "We figured Leary had just done a little too much acid and his imagination had gotten the best of him." Turns out he was onto something.

Leary himself prefaced one of his books with a comment that only a third of the ideas in it were worthwhile. But at their best, his latter-day writings offered a cheerful, funny vision of a post-industrial future, like Alvin Toffler crossed with Cheech and Chong. You'll find none of this material in Greenfield's book, which prefers to quote Leary at his least lucid and which skips quickly through the last two decades of his life.

The other problem is Greenfield's blinding disdain for his subject. There is, to be sure, a lot to dislike in the man. He could be selfish and astonishingly irresponsible, especially as a husband and a father; and there isn't much to admire in his apparent willingness to snitch on former friends as he struggled to get out of jail. But there's something odd about a biography that almost inevitably assumes, whenever Leary's account differs from that of another witness, that Leary's the one who's lying. (At the same time, Greenfield is willing to swallow obviously self-serving stories when Leary's memoirs are the only source available.)

This book alludes to Leary's charisma, but it never demonstrates it. By the time it's over, the average reader might be forgiven for asking why such a man ever attracted any followers in the first place. That's a pretty big failure in a biography of a pop icon. ■

Jesse Walker is managing editor of Reason and author of Rebels on the Air: An Alternative History of Radio in America.

Damn Yankees



Why is it that watching the New York Yankees do their annual postseason swoon gives me such pleasure? Once upon a time the Yankees were my

God, the first team I began to follow when I landed at LaGuardia airport in October 1948. That was the year the Yankees lost the pennant, as it was then called, to the Cleveland Indians, managed and led at shortstop by Lou Boudreau. A play by that name—"The Year the Yankees Lost the Pennant"—made it to Broadway some ten years later.

One of my father's employees took me to Yankee Stadium soon after my arrival, explained a few rules, and I was hooked. You have to take my word for it—I wouldn't know how to Google it if I tried—but I know the 1949 Yankee lineup as if I had it right in front of me. Old reliable Tommy Henrich at first; Jerry Coleman at second; the scooter, Phil Rizzuto, at short; and Dr. Bobby Brown at third. Johnny Lindell at left, Charley Keller at right, and the great Joe DiMaggio at center. Allie Reynolds, Vic Raschi, and lefty Eddie Lopat made up the core of the pitching staff, with Joe Page as the fireman relief ace.

About five years or so ago, at a party Conrad Black threw for his wife Barbara in New York, I sat opposite Richard Burt, the old Timesman and American ambassador to Bonn. We talked baseball, and when I listed the 1949 team he disagreed. I offered a large bet but he wouldn't take it, although he insisted he was right. Actually, we were both right. Hank Bauer and Gene Woodling were being platooned by Casey Stengel, the manager, when old Joe Di was injured, which he was for more than half the season.

But they won the pennant and the World Series in 1949, '50, '51, '52, '53, lost

it in '54, and came back to win in '55, '56, and on down to 1964, when the Mickey Mantle, Roger Maris, Yogi Berra dynasty finally came to an end. I was befriended by Mantle and Billy Martin in a nightclub in 1956, hung out a bit with them at El Morocco, and watched many a game from the Yankee dugout as their guest. They were wonderful men and sportsmen, drank hard and played harder, and never once used an excuse when whiffing or when being in a slump. Mickey played in pain throughout his life, but you'd never have known it.

So why the pleasure when the Yankees bite the dust? Well, put it this way: when the Yankees were owned by Dan Topping—his son, Dan Junior, was an acquaintance and fellow tennis player—it seemed like a big, happy family. The farm system had brought up players

lished stars others had nurtured was like buying other peoples' parents. Reggie Jackson as a Yankee? He always looked Oakland to me. Roger Clemens? Why, he's got Fenway Park written all over him. Alex Rodriguez made his mark in Seattle, but in the Big Bagel he has batted 4 for 41 with no runs batted in over his dozen playoff games for Noo Yawk.

Steinbrenner bought all-star caliber players for each position, overpaid them, and they came up with very little. Multimillionaires do not go the extra mile for glory. Randy Johnson, a 40-year-old pitching star that Steinbrenner bought from Arizona while the pitcher was on his way to Cooperstown, has not delivered the goods, and why should he? At 40 he needs his slippers more than the rosin bag.

Mind you, it's the same story over on the other side of the pond. There's Chelsea, a one-time wildly popular but unsuccessful football team, which was bought by a Russian oligarch—read

STEINBRENNER BOUGHT ALL-STAR CALIBER PLAYERS FOR EACH POSITION, OVERPAID THEM, AND THEY CAME UP WITH VERY LITTLE.

such as DiMaggio, Mantle, Henrich, Berra, and Martin. After CBS bought the team for \$10 million—less than what a tanker was worth back then, said my father—businessmen took over the franchise, and they've never looked back.

Steinbrenner, needless to say, forgot the time-honored farm-system tradition and decided to buy himself an all-star team once free agency came around. This was anathema to us old-fashioned fans. The Dodgers and Giants going west was bad enough. Buying estab-

major crook—for ten times what the team was worth. It did not matter to the buyer. He had billions to launder out of Russia, and he laundered them by buying 40 of the most expensive and biggest stars on the planet. Chelsea has done well, winning the league title, but has not won any European cups. 40 stars make a good group but not the best team.

Of course, compared to Russian kleptocrats Steinbrenner is a prince, but that doesn't mean an old-fashioned type like myself has to root for his team. Go Cubs. ■

